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Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2022 13:43:51 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>,
Tom Rix <trix@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
David Gow <davidgow@...gle.com>,
Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Sander Vanheule <sander@...nheule.net>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Isabella Basso <isabbasso@...eup.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
llvm@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] fortify: Use SIZE_MAX instead of (size_t)-1
Clean up uses of "(size_t)-1" in favor of SIZE_MAX.
Cc: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
include/linux/fortify-string.h | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/fortify-string.h b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
index 07d5d1921eff..8f2b6b1cb848 100644
--- a/include/linux/fortify-string.h
+++ b/include/linux/fortify-string.h
@@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("
#define __compiletime_strlen(p) \
({ \
unsigned char *__p = (unsigned char *)(p); \
- size_t __ret = (size_t)-1; \
+ size_t __ret = SIZE_MAX; \
size_t __p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1); \
- if (__p_size != (size_t)-1 && \
+ if (__p_size != SIZE_MAX && \
__builtin_constant_p(*__p)) { \
size_t __p_len = __p_size - 1; \
if (__builtin_constant_p(__p[__p_len]) && \
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
{
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX)
return __underlying_strcat(p, q);
if (strlcat(p, q, p_size) >= p_size)
fortify_panic(__func__);
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strnlen(const char * const POS p, __kernel_size
size_t ret;
/* We can take compile-time actions when maxlen is const. */
- if (__builtin_constant_p(maxlen) && p_len != (size_t)-1) {
+ if (__builtin_constant_p(maxlen) && p_len != SIZE_MAX) {
/* If p is const, we can use its compile-time-known len. */
if (maxlen >= p_size)
return p_len;
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ __kernel_size_t __fortify_strlen(const char * const POS p)
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
/* Give up if we don't know how large p is. */
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1)
+ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX)
return __underlying_strlen(p);
ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
if (p_size <= ret)
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE size_t strlcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, si
size_t q_len; /* Full count of source string length. */
size_t len; /* Count of characters going into destination. */
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
return __real_strlcpy(p, q, size);
q_len = strlen(q);
len = (q_len >= size) ? size - 1 : q_len;
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE ssize_t strscpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, s
size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
/* If we cannot get size of p and q default to call strscpy. */
- if (p_size == (size_t) -1 && q_size == (size_t) -1)
+ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
return __real_strscpy(p, q, size);
/*
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ char *strncat(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q, __kernel_size_t coun
size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
size_t q_size = __builtin_object_size(q, 1);
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
return __underlying_strncat(p, q, count);
p_len = strlen(p);
copy_len = strnlen(q, count);
@@ -299,10 +299,10 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memset_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
/*
* Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the
* field, when the buffer's remaining size is known.
- * (The -1 test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
+ * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
* lengths are unknown.)
*/
- if (p_size != (size_t)(-1) && p_size < size)
+ if (p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size)
fortify_panic("memset");
}
@@ -393,11 +393,11 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE void fortify_memcpy_chk(__kernel_size_t size,
/*
* Always stop accesses beyond the struct that contains the
* field, when the buffer's remaining size is known.
- * (The -1 test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
+ * (The SIZE_MAX test is to optimize away checks where the buffer
* lengths are unknown.)
*/
- if ((p_size != (size_t)(-1) && p_size < size) ||
- (q_size != (size_t)(-1) && q_size < size))
+ if ((p_size != SIZE_MAX && p_size < size) ||
+ (q_size != SIZE_MAX && q_size < size))
fortify_panic(func);
}
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ char *strcpy(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
size_t size;
/* If neither buffer size is known, immediately give up. */
- if (p_size == (size_t)-1 && q_size == (size_t)-1)
+ if (p_size == SIZE_MAX && q_size == SIZE_MAX)
return __underlying_strcpy(p, q);
size = strlen(q) + 1;
/* Compile-time check for const size overflow. */
--
2.34.1
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