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Message-Id: <0fb9caada66b79fcf8eb1d267db8c65d4885e1aa.1662361354.git.cdleonard@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2022 10:05:55 +0300
From: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@...il.com>
To: David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@...il.com>
Cc: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@...sta.com>,
Salam Noureddine <noureddine@...sta.com>,
Philip Paeps <philip@...uble.is>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.co.jp>,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>,
Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>,
Ivan Delalande <colona@...sta.com>,
Caowangbao <caowangbao@...wei.com>,
Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@...gle.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v8 19/26] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys
This provides a very brief summary of all keys for debugging purposes.
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@...il.com>
---
Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 10 +++
net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst
index 5631750cc3f7..2bceefe6fe1d 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst
+++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst
@@ -76,10 +76,20 @@ management. It also tries to behave predictably in all scenarios therefore it
breaks ties by numeric IDs.
A userspace daemon can use the "lock" flags to implement different key
management and key rotation policies.
+Proc interface
+--------------
+
+The ``/proc/net/tcp_authopt`` file contains a tab-separated table of keys. The
+first line contains column names. The number of columns might increase in the
+future if more matching criteria are added. Here is an example of the table::
+
+ flags send_id recv_id alg addr l3index
+ 0x44 0 0 1 10.10.2.2/31 0
+
ABI Reference
=============
.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h
:identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
index 28c10a916fb3..ba16b8c50565 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
@@ -5,10 +5,11 @@
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
/* This is mainly intended to protect against local privilege escalations through
* a rarely used feature so it is deliberately not namespaced.
*/
int sysctl_tcp_authopt;
@@ -1810,26 +1811,125 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
save_inbound_key_info(info, opt);
return 1;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tcp_authopt_inbound_check);
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+struct tcp_authopt_iter_state {
+ struct seq_net_private p;
+};
+
+static struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_get_key_index(struct netns_tcp_authopt *net,
+ int index)
+{
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(key, &net->head, node) {
+ if (--index < 0)
+ return key;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *tcp_authopt_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
+ __acquires(RCU)
+{
+ struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (*pos == 0)
+ return SEQ_START_TOKEN;
+ else
+ return tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos - 1);
+}
+
+static void tcp_authopt_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+ __releases(RCU)
+{
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void *tcp_authopt_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &seq_file_net(seq)->tcp_authopt;
+ void *ret;
+
+ ret = tcp_authopt_get_key_index(net, *pos);
+ ++*pos;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int tcp_authopt_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key = v;
+
+ /* FIXME: Document somewhere */
+ /* Key is deliberately inaccessible */
+ if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
+ seq_puts(seq, "flags\tsend_id\trecv_id\talg\taddr\tl3index\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "0x%x\t%d\t%d\t%d",
+ key->flags, key->send_id, key->recv_id, (int)key->alg_id);
+ if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_ADDR_BIND) {
+ if (key->addr.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI6", &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&key->addr)->sin6_addr);
+ else
+ seq_printf(seq, "\t%pI4", &((struct sockaddr_in *)&key->addr)->sin_addr);
+ if (key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_PREFIXLEN)
+ seq_printf(seq, "/%d", key->prefixlen);
+ } else {
+ seq_puts(seq, "\t*");
+ }
+ seq_printf(seq, "\t%d", key->l3index);
+ seq_puts(seq, "\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations tcp_authopt_seq_ops = {
+ .start = tcp_authopt_seq_start,
+ .next = tcp_authopt_seq_next,
+ .stop = tcp_authopt_seq_stop,
+ .show = tcp_authopt_seq_show,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+
+static int __net_init tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ if (!proc_create_net("tcp_authopt", 0400, net->proc_net,
+ &tcp_authopt_seq_ops,
+ sizeof(struct tcp_authopt_iter_state)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __net_exit tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ remove_proc_entry("tcp_authopt", net->proc_net);
+}
+
static int tcp_authopt_init_net(struct net *full_net)
{
struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt;
mutex_init(&net->mutex);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->head);
- return 0;
+ return tcp_authopt_proc_init_net(full_net);
}
static void tcp_authopt_exit_net(struct net *full_net)
{
struct netns_tcp_authopt *net = &full_net->tcp_authopt;
struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key;
struct hlist_node *n;
+ tcp_authopt_proc_exit_net(full_net);
mutex_lock(&net->mutex);
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(key, n, &net->head, node) {
hlist_del_rcu(&key->node);
tcp_authopt_key_put(key);
--
2.25.1
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