linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <047746e1134d5bdce699d8c021f849b6@walle.cc>
Date:   Tue, 06 Sep 2022 09:12:33 +0200
From:   Michael Walle <michael@...le.cc>
To:     Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
Cc:     jarkko@...nel.org, a.fatoum@...gutronix.de, Jason@...c4.com,
        jejb@...ux.ibm.com, zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
        sumit.garg@...aro.org, david@...ma-star.at, john.ernberg@...ia.se,
        jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
        davem@...emloft.net, j.luebbe@...gutronix.de, ebiggers@...nel.org,
        richard@....at, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, sahil.malhotra@....com,
        kshitiz.varshney@....com, horia.geanta@....com, V.Sethi@....com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY

Hi,

Am 2022-09-06 08:51, schrieb Pankaj Gupta:
> Hardware Bound key(HBK), is never acessible as plain key outside of the
> hardware boundary. Thus, it is un-usable, even if somehow fetched
> from kernel memory. It ensures run-time security.
> 
> This patchset adds generic support for classing the Hardware Bound Key,
> based on:
> 
> - Newly added flag-'is_hbk', added to the tfm.
> 
>   Consumer of the kernel crypto api, after allocating
>   the transformation, sets this flag based on the basis
>   of the type of key consumer has.
> 
> - This helps to influence the core processing logic
>   for the encapsulated algorithm.
> 
> - This flag is set by the consumer after allocating
>   the tfm and before calling the function crypto_xxx_setkey().
> 
> First implementation is based on CAAM.
> 
> NXP built CAAM IP is the Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance 
> Module.
> This is contain by the i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
> 
> CAAM is a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
> This backend source can be used for run-time security as well
> by generating the hardware bound key.
> 
> Along with plain key, the CAAM generates black key. A black key is an
> encrypted key, which can only be decrypted inside CAAM. Hence, CAAM's
> black key can only be used by CAAM. Thus it is declared as a hardware 
> bound key.

What is the difference to the current trusted keys with CAAM?
When I tested the patch series back then, I wasn't able to import
a sealed key on another board with the same SoC.

-michael