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Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bXks8ohNAxdJ7gGOc=tg7bC7Pz+nBJi_J9zHa5Jhta9w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2022 09:17:24 +0200
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov@...il.com>,
syzbot <syzbot+08ca1fa706a22cc17efe@...kaller.appspotmail.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-next@...r.kernel.org, sfr@...b.auug.org.au,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>
Subject: Re: [syzbot] linux-next boot error: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in _find_next_bit
On Wed, 7 Sept 2022 at 07:53, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > > > The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888017576600
> > > > which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
> > > > The buggy address is located 184 bytes inside of
> > > > 192-byte region [ffff888017576600, ffff8880175766c0)
> > >
> > > At offset 184 of a 192-byte region.
> > >
> > > So what's wrong with doing that? Does KASAN have an off-by-one?
> >
> > Hi Andrew, all,
> >
> > This is a bug in FIND_NEXT_BIT(). It should be
> > if (idx >= sz / BITS_PER_LONG) \
> > goto out; \
> >
> > instead of
> > if (idx > sz / BITS_PER_LONG) \
> > goto out; \
> >
> > The fix is in bitmap-for-next, expected to be in -next by tomorrow.
> > Sorry for the noise.
>
> OK... but why is KASAN reporting a bad access from an area
> which appears to be OK?
Hi Andrew,
Good point. Filed https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216457 for this.
Copy-pasting description below:
KASAN says:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _find_next_bit+0x143/0x160 lib/find_bit.c:109
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880175766b8 by task kworker/1:1/26
...
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888017576600
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 184 bytes inside of
192-byte region [ffff888017576600, ffff8880175766c0)
...
Memory state around the buggy address:
>ffff888017576680: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
==================================================================
This "address is located 184 bytes inside of 192-byte region" is
confusing b/c it does not look like an out-of-bounds access.
What happens here is that the allocation request was for 184 bytes, so
the last 8 bytes in the 192-byte slab are poisoned. But KASAN does not
store the requested size in the object header, so it just prints the
full slab size everywhere.
User-space ASAN does store 48-bit requested size in the header. But
KASAN uses additional bytes in the header for:
struct kasan_alloc_meta {
depot_stack_handle_t aux_stack[2];
So we don't have space for requested size w/o increasing header size
(currently should be 16 bytes).
We could either try to infer requested size from the shadow (count
poisoned bytes at the end); or improve wording of the message at least
to make it clear that 192 is just full slab size.
For context see:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220906173154.6f2664c8fc6b83470c5dfea1@linux-foundation.org/
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