linux-kernel - Re: [EXT] [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY

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Date:   Wed, 07 Sep 2022 10:11:40 +0200
From:   Michael Walle <michael@...le.cc>
To:     David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
Cc:     Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>,
        Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>, Jason@...c4.com,
        James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>, john.ernberg@...ia.se,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@...gutronix.de>,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@....com>,
        Kshitiz Varshney <kshitiz.varshney@....com>,
        Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Varun Sethi <V.Sethi@....com>
Subject: Re: [EXT] [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY

Hi David,

Am 2022-09-07 09:46, schrieb David Gstir:
>> On 07.09.2022, at 09:29, Michael Walle <michael@...le.cc> wrote:
>> 
>> Am 2022-09-07 09:22, schrieb Pankaj Gupta:
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Michael Walle <michael@...le.cc>
>>>> Sent: Tuesday, September 6, 2022 12:43 PM
>>>> To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@....com>
>>>> Cc: jarkko@...nel.org; a.fatoum@...gutronix.de; Jason@...c4.com;
>>>> jejb@...ux.ibm.com; zohar@...ux.ibm.com; dhowells@...hat.com;
>>>> sumit.garg@...aro.org; david@...ma-star.at; john.ernberg@...ia.se;
>>>> jmorris@...ei.org; serge@...lyn.com; herbert@...dor.apana.org.au;
>>>> davem@...emloft.net; j.luebbe@...gutronix.de; ebiggers@...nel.org;
>>>> richard@....at; keyrings@...r.kernel.org; 
>>>> linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org;
>>>> linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; 
>>>> linux-
>>>> security-module@...r.kernel.org; Sahil Malhotra
>>>> <sahil.malhotra@....com>; Kshitiz Varshney 
>>>> <kshitiz.varshney@....com>;
>>>> Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>; Varun Sethi <V.Sethi@....com>
>>>> Subject: [EXT] Re: [RFC PATCH HBK: 0/8] HW BOUND KEY as TRUSTED KEY
>>>> Caution: EXT Email
>>>> Hi,
>>>> Am 2022-09-06 08:51, schrieb Pankaj Gupta:
>>>> > Hardware Bound key(HBK), is never acessible as plain key outside of
>>>> > the hardware boundary. Thus, it is un-usable, even if somehow fetched
>>>> > from kernel memory. It ensures run-time security.
>>>> >
>>>> > This patchset adds generic support for classing the Hardware Bound
>>>> > Key, based on:
>>>> >
>>>> > - Newly added flag-'is_hbk', added to the tfm.
>>>> >
>>>> >   Consumer of the kernel crypto api, after allocating
>>>> >   the transformation, sets this flag based on the basis
>>>> >   of the type of key consumer has.
>>>> >
>>>> > - This helps to influence the core processing logic
>>>> >   for the encapsulated algorithm.
>>>> >
>>>> > - This flag is set by the consumer after allocating
>>>> >   the tfm and before calling the function crypto_xxx_setkey().
>>>> >
>>>> > First implementation is based on CAAM.
>>>> >
>>>> > NXP built CAAM IP is the Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance
>>>> > Module.
>>>> > This is contain by the i.MX and QorIQ SoCs by NXP.
>>>> >
>>>> > CAAM is a suitable backend (source) for kernel trusted keys.
>>>> > This backend source can be used for run-time security as well by
>>>> > generating the hardware bound key.
>>>> >
>>>> > Along with plain key, the CAAM generates black key. A black key is an
>>>> > encrypted key, which can only be decrypted inside CAAM. Hence, CAAM's
>>>> > black key can only be used by CAAM. Thus it is declared as a hardware
>>>> > bound key.
>>>> What is the difference to the current trusted keys with CAAM?
>>>> When I tested the patch series back then, I wasn't able to import a 
>>>> sealed
>>>> key on another board with the same SoC.
>>> Currently, keys that are part of trusted key-ring, contains plain 
>>> key.
>>> With this patch-set, these key will become Hw Bound Key, which is not
>>> a plain key anymore.
>>> After this patch-set, if somehow the HB-key is retrieved from the
>>> keyring, the retrieved key  would be un-usable without hw.
>> 
>> This doesn't answer my question why I couldn't import one key on
>> another board with the same SoC.
> 
> I don’t believe this is intended to work this way. Each key blob
> created by CAAM is bound
> to a specific device. Being able to decrypt the same blob on another 
> SoC would
> open up some attack vectors: Think of a locked down device where I’m 
> able to
> extract this key blob. Simply buying a board with the same Soc would 
> allow me to
> decrypt this blob by copying it over to my board.

I agree, thus my first question here was, what this series is adding,
if the key is already "bound" to the hardware. That is what I don't
understand.

-michael

> Roughly speaking, CAAM key blobs are secure using a key derived from
> the device’s master
> key. This master key can be programmed via eFUSEs. So you’d have to
> burn the same master
> key on both SoCs and it should work.
> 
> In any way, check the security reference manual for your SoC. It
> should explain this in more detail.