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Message-ID: <YxoY+hDrmNwvmbiM@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 12:31:54 -0400
From: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@...nel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dm-devel@...hat.com,
dianders@...omium.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
mka@...omium.org, sarthakkukreti@...omium.org, agk@...hat.com
Subject: Re: dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
On Thu, Sep 08 2022 at 12:13P -0400,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 08, 2022 at 11:25:36AM -0400, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 07 2022 at 6:34P -0400,
> > Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> >
> > > On Wed, 7 Sep 2022 13:30:58 -0700, Matthias Kaehlcke wrote:
> > > > Verity targets can be configured to ignore corrupted data blocks.
> > > > LoadPin must only trust verity targets that are configured to
> > > > perform some kind of enforcement when data corruption is detected,
> > > > like returning an error, restarting the system or triggering a
> > > > panic.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > [...]
> > >
> > > Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
> > >
> > > [1/1] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
> > > https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/2e1875c05267
> >
> > Does this mean you're intending to send this upstream? I prefer to
> > take all DM changes unless there is an external dependency.
>
> Oh! Yeah, I added it to my tree since you'd asked me to take the
> original verity-loadpin series and this was a fix. I'm happy either
> way. Shall I drop this change from my tree?
Let's leave it in your tree if you'll be sending this as a fix for
6.0-rc?
But moving forward, I'll take new development that is localized to DM.
Sound good?
Thanks,
Mike
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