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Date:   Thu, 15 Sep 2022 22:29:06 +0800
From:   Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        qemu-devel@...gnu.org
Cc:     Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
        Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
        "Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        luto@...nel.org, jun.nakajima@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        ak@...ux.intel.com, david@...hat.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
        ddutile@...hat.com, dhildenb@...hat.com,
        Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, mhocko@...e.com,
        Muchun Song <songmuchun@...edance.com>, wei.w.wang@...el.com
Subject: [PATCH v8 1/8] mm/memfd: Introduce userspace inaccessible memfd

From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>

KVM can use memfd-provided memory for guest memory. For normal userspace
accessible memory, KVM userspace (e.g. QEMU) mmaps the memfd into its
virtual address space and then tells KVM to use the virtual address to
setup the mapping in the secondary page table (e.g. EPT).

With confidential computing technologies like Intel TDX, the
memfd-provided memory may be encrypted with special key for special
software domain (e.g. KVM guest) and is not expected to be directly
accessed by userspace. Precisely, userspace access to such encrypted
memory may lead to host crash so it should be prevented.

This patch introduces userspace inaccessible memfd (created with
MFD_INACCESSIBLE). Its memory is inaccessible from userspace through
ordinary MMU access (e.g. read/write/mmap) but can be accessed via
in-kernel interface so KVM can directly interact with core-mm without
the need to map the memory into KVM userspace.

It provides semantics required for KVM guest private(encrypted) memory
support that a file descriptor with this flag set is going to be used as
the source of guest memory in confidential computing environments such
as Intel TDX/AMD SEV.

KVM userspace is still in charge of the lifecycle of the memfd. It
should pass the opened fd to KVM. KVM uses the kernel APIs newly added
in this patch to obtain the physical memory address and then populate
the secondary page table entries.

The userspace inaccessible memfd can be fallocate-ed and hole-punched
from userspace. When hole-punching happens, KVM can get notified through
inaccessible_notifier it then gets chance to remove any mapped entries
of the range in the secondary page tables.

The userspace inaccessible memfd itself is implemented as a shim layer
on top of real memory file systems like tmpfs/hugetlbfs but this patch
only implemented tmpfs. The allocated memory is currently marked as
unmovable and unevictable, this is required for current confidential
usage. But in future this might be changed.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/memfd.h      |  24 ++++
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/memfd.h |   1 +
 mm/Makefile                |   2 +-
 mm/memfd.c                 |  25 ++++-
 mm/memfd_inaccessible.c    | 219 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 mm/memfd_inaccessible.c

diff --git a/include/linux/memfd.h b/include/linux/memfd.h
index 4f1600413f91..334ddff08377 100644
--- a/include/linux/memfd.h
+++ b/include/linux/memfd.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #define __LINUX_MEMFD_H
 
 #include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/pfn_t.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE
 extern long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
@@ -13,4 +14,27 @@ static inline long memfd_fcntl(struct file *f, unsigned int c, unsigned long a)
 }
 #endif
 
+struct inaccessible_notifier;
+
+struct inaccessible_notifier_ops {
+	void (*invalidate)(struct inaccessible_notifier *notifier,
+			   pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end);
+};
+
+struct inaccessible_notifier {
+	struct list_head list;
+	const struct inaccessible_notifier_ops *ops;
+};
+
+void inaccessible_register_notifier(struct file *file,
+				    struct inaccessible_notifier *notifier);
+void inaccessible_unregister_notifier(struct file *file,
+				      struct inaccessible_notifier *notifier);
+
+int inaccessible_get_pfn(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset, pfn_t *pfn,
+			 int *order);
+void inaccessible_put_pfn(struct file *file, pfn_t pfn);
+
+struct file *memfd_mkinaccessible(struct file *memfd);
+
 #endif /* __LINUX_MEMFD_H */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
index 6325d1d0e90f..9d066be3d7e8 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
@@ -101,5 +101,6 @@
 #define DMA_BUF_MAGIC		0x444d4142	/* "DMAB" */
 #define DEVMEM_MAGIC		0x454d444d	/* "DMEM" */
 #define SECRETMEM_MAGIC		0x5345434d	/* "SECM" */
+#define INACCESSIBLE_MAGIC	0x494e4143	/* "INAC" */
 
 #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
index 7a8a26751c23..48750474b904 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/memfd.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #define MFD_CLOEXEC		0x0001U
 #define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING	0x0002U
 #define MFD_HUGETLB		0x0004U
+#define MFD_INACCESSIBLE	0x0008U
 
 /*
  * Huge page size encoding when MFD_HUGETLB is specified, and a huge page
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index 9a564f836403..f82e5d4b4388 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY) += usercopy.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_STATS) += percpu-stats.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE) += memremap.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_HMM_MIRROR) += hmm.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o memfd_inaccessible.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
index 08f5f8304746..1853a90f49ff 100644
--- a/mm/memfd.c
+++ b/mm/memfd.c
@@ -261,7 +261,8 @@ long memfd_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 #define MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof(MFD_NAME_PREFIX) - 1)
 #define MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN (NAME_MAX - MFD_NAME_PREFIX_LEN)
 
-#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB)
+#define MFD_ALL_FLAGS (MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING | MFD_HUGETLB | \
+		       MFD_INACCESSIBLE)
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
 		const char __user *, uname,
@@ -283,6 +284,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	/* Disallow sealing when MFD_INACCESSIBLE is set. */
+	if ((flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE) && (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* TODO: add hugetlb support */
+	if ((flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE) && (flags & MFD_HUGETLB))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* length includes terminating zero */
 	len = strnlen_user(uname, MFD_NAME_MAX_LEN + 1);
 	if (len <= 0)
@@ -331,10 +340,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
 		*file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
 	}
 
+	if (flags & MFD_INACCESSIBLE) {
+		struct file *inaccessible_file;
+
+		inaccessible_file = memfd_mkinaccessible(file);
+		if (IS_ERR(inaccessible_file)) {
+			error = PTR_ERR(inaccessible_file);
+			goto err_file;
+		}
+
+		file = inaccessible_file;
+	}
+
 	fd_install(fd, file);
 	kfree(name);
 	return fd;
 
+err_file:
+	fput(file);
 err_fd:
 	put_unused_fd(fd);
 err_name:
diff --git a/mm/memfd_inaccessible.c b/mm/memfd_inaccessible.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2d33cbdd9282
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/memfd_inaccessible.c
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "linux/sbitmap.h"
+#include <linux/memfd.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/falloc.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
+
+struct inaccessible_data {
+	struct mutex lock;
+	struct file *memfd;
+	struct list_head notifiers;
+};
+
+static void inaccessible_notifier_invalidate(struct inaccessible_data *data,
+				 pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end)
+{
+	struct inaccessible_notifier *notifier;
+
+	mutex_lock(&data->lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(notifier, &data->notifiers, list) {
+		notifier->ops->invalidate(notifier, start, end);
+	}
+	mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
+}
+
+static int inaccessible_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inaccessible_data *data = inode->i_mapping->private_data;
+
+	fput(data->memfd);
+	kfree(data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static long inaccessible_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
+				   loff_t offset, loff_t len)
+{
+	struct inaccessible_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
+	struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
+		if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(offset) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(len))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ret = memfd->f_op->fallocate(memfd, mode, offset, len);
+	inaccessible_notifier_invalidate(data, offset, offset + len);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations inaccessible_fops = {
+	.release = inaccessible_release,
+	.fallocate = inaccessible_fallocate,
+};
+
+static int inaccessible_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
+				u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
+	struct inaccessible_data *data = inode->i_mapping->private_data;
+	struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
+
+	return memfd->f_inode->i_op->getattr(mnt_userns, path, stat,
+					     request_mask, query_flags);
+}
+
+static int inaccessible_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
+	struct inaccessible_data *data = inode->i_mapping->private_data;
+	struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
+		if (memfd->f_inode->i_size)
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(attr->ia_size))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	ret = memfd->f_inode->i_op->setattr(mnt_userns,
+					    file_dentry(memfd), attr);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct inode_operations inaccessible_iops = {
+	.getattr = inaccessible_getattr,
+	.setattr = inaccessible_setattr,
+};
+
+static int inaccessible_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+	if (!init_pseudo(fc, INACCESSIBLE_MAGIC))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	fc->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type inaccessible_fs = {
+	.owner		= THIS_MODULE,
+	.name		= "[inaccessible]",
+	.init_fs_context = inaccessible_init_fs_context,
+	.kill_sb	= kill_anon_super,
+};
+
+static struct vfsmount *inaccessible_mnt;
+
+static __init int inaccessible_init(void)
+{
+	inaccessible_mnt = kern_mount(&inaccessible_fs);
+	if (IS_ERR(inaccessible_mnt))
+		return PTR_ERR(inaccessible_mnt);
+	return 0;
+}
+fs_initcall(inaccessible_init);
+
+struct file *memfd_mkinaccessible(struct file *memfd)
+{
+	struct inaccessible_data *data;
+	struct address_space *mapping;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct file *file;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!data)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	data->memfd = memfd;
+	mutex_init(&data->lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data->notifiers);
+
+	inode = alloc_anon_inode(inaccessible_mnt->mnt_sb);
+	if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
+		kfree(data);
+		return ERR_CAST(inode);
+	}
+
+	inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
+	inode->i_op = &inaccessible_iops;
+	inode->i_mapping->private_data = data;
+
+	file = alloc_file_pseudo(inode, inaccessible_mnt,
+				 "[memfd:inaccessible]", O_RDWR,
+				 &inaccessible_fops);
+	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+		iput(inode);
+		kfree(data);
+	}
+
+	file->f_flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
+
+	mapping = memfd->f_mapping;
+	mapping_set_unevictable(mapping);
+	mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping,
+			     mapping_gfp_mask(mapping) & ~__GFP_MOVABLE);
+
+	return file;
+}
+
+void inaccessible_register_notifier(struct file *file,
+				    struct inaccessible_notifier *notifier)
+{
+	struct inaccessible_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
+
+	mutex_lock(&data->lock);
+	list_add(&notifier->list, &data->notifiers);
+	mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inaccessible_register_notifier);
+
+void inaccessible_unregister_notifier(struct file *file,
+				      struct inaccessible_notifier *notifier)
+{
+	struct inaccessible_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
+
+	mutex_lock(&data->lock);
+	list_del(&notifier->list);
+	mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inaccessible_unregister_notifier);
+
+int inaccessible_get_pfn(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset, pfn_t *pfn,
+			 int *order)
+{
+	struct inaccessible_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
+	struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
+	struct page *page;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = shmem_getpage(file_inode(memfd), offset, &page, SGP_WRITE);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	*pfn = page_to_pfn_t(page);
+	*order = thp_order(compound_head(page));
+	SetPageUptodate(page);
+	unlock_page(page);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inaccessible_get_pfn);
+
+void inaccessible_put_pfn(struct file *file, pfn_t pfn)
+{
+	struct page *page = pfn_t_to_page(pfn);
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!page))
+		return;
+
+	put_page(page);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inaccessible_put_pfn);
-- 
2.25.1

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