linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation

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Message-ID: <20220920084648.GA17087@duo.ucw.cz>
Date:   Tue, 20 Sep 2022 10:46:48 +0200
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:     Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, gwendal@...omium.org,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@...ora.tech>, jarkko@...nel.org,
        zohar@...ux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        apronin@...omium.org, dlunev@...gle.com, rjw@...ysocki.net,
        linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, corbet@....net, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Hao Wu <hao.wu@...rik.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
        Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, axelj <axelj@...s.com>,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation

Hi!

> We are exploring enabling hibernation in some new scenarios. However,
> our security team has a few requirements, listed below:
> 1. The hibernate image must be encrypted with protection derived from
>    both the platform (eg TPM) and user authentication data (eg
>    password).
> 2. Hibernation must not be a vector by which a malicious userspace can
>    escalate to the kernel.

Why is #2 reasonable requirement?

We normally allow userspace with appropriate permissions to update the
kernel, for example.

Best regards,
								Pavel
-- 
People of Russia, stop Putin before his war on Ukraine escalates.

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