linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation

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Message-ID: <YytTQPOlAC58Bk7W@ziepe.ca>
Date:   Wed, 21 Sep 2022 15:09:04 -0300
From:   Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>
To:     Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc:     Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        gwendal@...omium.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@...ora.tech>, jarkko@...nel.org,
        zohar@...ux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
        apronin@...omium.org, dlunev@...gle.com, rjw@...ysocki.net,
        linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, corbet@....net, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Hao Wu <hao.wu@...rik.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>,
        "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, axelj <axelj@...s.com>,
        keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation

On Tue, Sep 20, 2022 at 10:46:48AM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
> 
> > We are exploring enabling hibernation in some new scenarios. However,
> > our security team has a few requirements, listed below:
> > 1. The hibernate image must be encrypted with protection derived from
> >    both the platform (eg TPM) and user authentication data (eg
> >    password).
> > 2. Hibernation must not be a vector by which a malicious userspace can
> >    escalate to the kernel.
> 
> Why is #2 reasonable requirement?

These days with kernel lockdown we don't allow userspace to enter the
kernel

> We normally allow userspace with appropriate permissions to update the
> kernel, for example.

And in a lockdown secure boot environment only a signed kernel can be
booted in the first place.

A series like this is effectively carrying the secure boot trust
across the hibernation

Jason