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Message-ID: <YytTQPOlAC58Bk7W@ziepe.ca>
Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2022 15:09:04 -0300
From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
Cc: Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
gwendal@...omium.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@...ora.tech>, jarkko@...nel.org,
zohar@...ux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
apronin@...omium.org, dlunev@...gle.com, rjw@...ysocki.net,
linux-pm@...r.kernel.org, corbet@....net, jejb@...ux.ibm.com,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Hao Wu <hao.wu@...rik.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@...gle.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, axelj <axelj@...s.com>,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/10] Encrypted Hibernation
On Tue, Sep 20, 2022 at 10:46:48AM +0200, Pavel Machek wrote:
> Hi!
>
> > We are exploring enabling hibernation in some new scenarios. However,
> > our security team has a few requirements, listed below:
> > 1. The hibernate image must be encrypted with protection derived from
> > both the platform (eg TPM) and user authentication data (eg
> > password).
> > 2. Hibernation must not be a vector by which a malicious userspace can
> > escalate to the kernel.
>
> Why is #2 reasonable requirement?
These days with kernel lockdown we don't allow userspace to enter the
kernel
> We normally allow userspace with appropriate permissions to update the
> kernel, for example.
And in a lockdown secure boot environment only a signed kernel can be
booted in the first place.
A series like this is effectively carrying the secure boot trust
across the hibernation
Jason
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