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Message-ID: <CAE=gft4twDMw8zpp1o0hv+SFFQtGNxkAivBg0VC2Pax1ez7qzg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2022 15:23:43 -0700
From: Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@...omium.org>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@...ora.tech>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
apronin@...omium.org, Daniil Lunev <dlunev@...gle.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@...ysocki.net>,
Linux PM <linux-pm@...r.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
"James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>,
Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 07/10] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image
On Tue, Sep 20, 2022 at 4:16 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 03:25:23PM -0700, Evan Green wrote:
> > When using encrypted hibernate images, have the TPM create a key for us
> > and seal it. By handing back a sealed blob instead of the raw key, we
> > prevent usermode from being able to decrypt and tamper with the
> > hibernate image on a different machine.
> >
> > We'll also go through the motions of having PCR23 set to a known value at
> > the time of key creation and unsealing. Currently there's nothing that
> > enforces the contents of PCR23 as a condition to unseal the key blob,
> > that will come in a later change.
> >
> > Sourced-from: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@...omium.org>
> >
> > ---
> > Matthew's incarnation of this patch is at:
> > https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-pm/patch/20210220013255.1083202-9-matthewgarrett@google.com/
> >
> > Changes in v2:
> > - Rework load/create_kernel_key() to eliminate a label (Andrey)
> > - Call put_device() needed from calling tpm_default_chip().
> >
> > kernel/power/Kconfig | 2 +
> > kernel/power/snapenc.c | 207 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> > kernel/power/user.h | 1 +
> > 3 files changed, 201 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig
> > index cd574af0b43379..ff15361c5d8fad 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig
> > +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig
> > @@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ config ENCRYPTED_HIBERNATION
> > bool "Encryption support for userspace snapshots"
> > depends on HIBERNATION_SNAPSHOT_DEV
> > depends on CRYPTO_AEAD2=y
> > + depends on KEYS
> > + depends on TRUSTED_KEYS
>
> nit: TRUSTED_KEYS already depends on KEYS, so the KEYS depend can be
> dropped.
>
> > default n
> > help
> > Enable support for kernel-based encryption of hibernation snapshots
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/snapenc.c b/kernel/power/snapenc.c
> > index cb90692d6ab83a..90079f6d4f184b 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/snapenc.c
> > +++ b/kernel/power/snapenc.c
> > @@ -4,13 +4,23 @@
> > #include <linux/crypto.h>
> > #include <crypto/aead.h>
> > #include <crypto/gcm.h>
> > +#include <keys/trusted-type.h>
> > +#include <linux/key-type.h>
> > #include <linux/random.h>
> > #include <linux/mm.h>
> > +#include <linux/tpm.h>
> > #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >
> > #include "power.h"
> > #include "user.h"
> >
> > +/* sha256("To sleep, perchance to dream") */
> > +static struct tpm_digest known_digest = { .alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA256,
> > + .digest = {0x92, 0x78, 0x3d, 0x79, 0x2d, 0x00, 0x31, 0xb0, 0x55, 0xf9,
> > + 0x1e, 0x0d, 0xce, 0x83, 0xde, 0x1d, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0x8e, 0x8c,
> > + 0xf1, 0x22, 0x38, 0x6c, 0x33, 0xb1, 0x14, 0xb7, 0xec, 0x05,
> > + 0x5f, 0x49}};
> > +
> > /* Encrypt more data from the snapshot into the staging area. */
> > static int snapshot_encrypt_refill(struct snapshot_data *data)
> > {
> > @@ -313,6 +323,12 @@ void snapshot_teardown_encryption(struct snapshot_data *data)
> > {
> > int i;
> >
> > + if (data->key) {
> > + key_revoke(data->key);
> > + key_put(data->key);
> > + data->key = NULL;
> > + }
> > +
> > if (data->aead_req) {
> > aead_request_free(data->aead_req);
> > data->aead_req = NULL;
> > @@ -381,11 +397,83 @@ static int snapshot_setup_encryption_common(struct snapshot_data *data)
> > return rc;
> > }
> >
> > +static int snapshot_create_kernel_key(struct snapshot_data *data)
> > +{
> > + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > + struct tpm_digest *digests = NULL;
> > + struct tpm_chip *chip;
> > + struct key *key = NULL;
> > + int ret, i;
> > + /* Create a key sealed by the SRK. */
> > + char *keyinfo = "new\t32\tkeyhandle=0x81000000";
> > +
> > + chip = tpm_default_chip();
> > + if (!chip)
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > +
> > + if (!(tpm_is_tpm2(chip))) {
> > + ret = -ENODEV;
> > + goto out_dev;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = tpm_pcr_reset(chip, 23);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(struct tpm_digest),
> > + GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!digests) {
> > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i <= chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
> > + digests[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
> > + if (digests[i].alg_id == known_digest.alg_id)
> > + memcpy(&digests[i], &known_digest, sizeof(known_digest));
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = tpm_pcr_extend(chip, 23, digests);
> > + if (ret != 0)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + key = key_alloc(&key_type_trusted, "swsusp", GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
> > + GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
> > + NULL);
> > +
> > + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(key);
> > + key = NULL;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = key_instantiate_and_link(key, keyinfo, strlen(keyinfo) + 1, NULL,
> > + NULL);
> > + if (ret != 0)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + data->key = key;
> > + key = NULL;
> > +
> > +out:
> > + if (key) {
> > + key_revoke(key);
> > + key_put(key);
> > + }
> > +
> > + kfree(digests);
> > + tpm_pcr_reset(chip, 23);
> > +
> > +out_dev:
> > + put_device(&chip->dev);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data,
> > struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key)
> > {
> > - u8 aead_key[SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE];
> > u8 nonce[USWSUSP_KEY_NONCE_SIZE];
> > + struct trusted_key_payload *payload;
> > int rc;
> > /* Don't pull a random key from a world that can be reset. */
> > if (data->ready)
> > @@ -399,21 +487,28 @@ int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data,
> > get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
> > memcpy(&data->nonce_low, &nonce[0], sizeof(data->nonce_low));
> > memcpy(&data->nonce_high, &nonce[8], sizeof(data->nonce_high));
> > - /* Build a random key */
> > - get_random_bytes(aead_key, sizeof(aead_key));
> > - rc = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, aead_key, sizeof(aead_key));
> > +
> > + /* Create a kernel key, and set it. */
> > + rc = snapshot_create_kernel_key(data);
> > + if (rc)
> > + goto fail;
> > +
> > + payload = data->key->payload.data[0];
> > + /* Install the key */
> > + rc = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, payload->key, SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE);
> > if (rc)
> > goto fail;
> >
> > - /* Hand the key back to user mode (to be changed!) */
> > - rc = put_user(sizeof(struct uswsusp_key_blob), &key->blob_len);
> > + /* Hand the key back to user mode in sealed form. */
> > + rc = put_user(payload->blob_len, &key->blob_len);
> > if (rc)
> > goto fail;
> >
> > - rc = copy_to_user(&key->blob, &aead_key, sizeof(aead_key));
> > + rc = copy_to_user(&key->blob, &payload->blob, payload->blob_len);
> > if (rc)
> > goto fail;
> >
> > + /* The nonce just gets handed back in the clear. */
> > rc = copy_to_user(&key->nonce, &nonce, sizeof(nonce));
> > if (rc)
> > goto fail;
> > @@ -425,10 +520,99 @@ int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data,
> > return rc;
> > }
> >
> > +static int snapshot_load_kernel_key(struct snapshot_data *data,
> > + struct uswsusp_key_blob *blob)
> > +{
> > +
> > + const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > + char *keytemplate = "load\t%s\tkeyhandle=0x81000000";
> > + struct tpm_digest *digests = NULL;
> > + char *blobstring = NULL;
> > + char *keyinfo = NULL;
> > + struct tpm_chip *chip;
> > + struct key *key = NULL;
> > + int i, ret;
> > +
> > + chip = tpm_default_chip();
> > + if (!chip)
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > +
> > + if (!(tpm_is_tpm2(chip))) {
> > + ret = -ENODEV;
> > + goto out_dev;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = tpm_pcr_reset(chip, 23);
> > + if (ret)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(struct tpm_digest),
> > + GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!digests)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + for (i = 0; i <= chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++) {
> > + digests[i].alg_id = chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
> > + if (digests[i].alg_id == known_digest.alg_id)
> > + memcpy(&digests[i], &known_digest, sizeof(known_digest));
> > + }
>
> So I can confirm my unerstanding here: this is just putting a starting
> value in the PCR? (As mentioned in the commit log?)
Correct, the PCR is reset above and set (well, extended from 0) to the
magic value here ahead of the unseal operation. Once we add the policy
in patch 10, the TPM will refuse to unseal the key unless PCR23 is set
to this magic value.
>
> > +
> > + ret = tpm_pcr_extend(chip, 23, digests);
> > + if (ret != 0)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + blobstring = kmalloc(blob->blob_len * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!blobstring) {
> > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + bin2hex(blobstring, blob->blob, blob->blob_len);
> > + keyinfo = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, keytemplate, blobstring);
> > + if (!keyinfo) {
> > + ret = -ENOMEM;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + key = key_alloc(&key_type_trusted, "swsusp", GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
> > + GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
> > + NULL);
> > +
> > + if (IS_ERR(key)) {
> > + ret = PTR_ERR(key);
> > + key = NULL;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> > +
> > + ret = key_instantiate_and_link(key, keyinfo, strlen(keyinfo) + 1, NULL,
> > + NULL);
>
> You want to keep the trailing NUL byte here so it's easier to read back
> later? Reading it back will need to verify the trailing NUL regardless.
> (Does this get read back?)
Are you referring to the trailing nul on keyinfo? The keyinfo string
is only used within this function, as key_instantiate_and_link()
receives it as a parameter string. I can see that
trusted_instantiate() also null-terminates the buffer defensively for
itself, but it still seemed prudent to hand in a terminated string. I
can remove the + 1 if you think it's better.
>
> > + if (ret != 0)
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > + data->key = key;
> > + key = NULL;
> > +
> > +out:
> > + if (key) {
> > + key_revoke(key);
> > + key_put(key);
> > + }
> > +
> > + kfree(keyinfo);
> > + kfree(blobstring);
> > + kfree(digests);
> > + tpm_pcr_reset(chip, 23);
> > +
> > +out_dev:
> > + put_device(&chip->dev);
> > + return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > int snapshot_set_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data,
> > struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key)
> > {
> > struct uswsusp_key_blob blob;
> > + struct trusted_key_payload *payload;
> > int rc;
> >
> > /* It's too late if data's been pushed in. */
> > @@ -444,13 +628,18 @@ int snapshot_set_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data,
> > if (rc)
> > goto crypto_setup_fail;
> >
> > - if (blob.blob_len != sizeof(struct uswsusp_key_blob)) {
> > + if (blob.blob_len > sizeof(key->blob)) {
> > rc = -EINVAL;
> > goto crypto_setup_fail;
> > }
> >
> > + rc = snapshot_load_kernel_key(data, &blob);
> > + if (rc)
> > + goto crypto_setup_fail;
> > +
> > + payload = data->key->payload.data[0];
> > rc = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm,
> > - blob.blob,
> > + payload->key,
> > SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE);
> >
> > if (rc)
> > diff --git a/kernel/power/user.h b/kernel/power/user.h
> > index 6823e2eba7ec53..591b30bb213349 100644
> > --- a/kernel/power/user.h
> > +++ b/kernel/power/user.h
> > @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ struct snapshot_data {
> > uint64_t crypt_total;
> > uint64_t nonce_low;
> > uint64_t nonce_high;
> > + struct key *key;
> > #endif
> >
> > };
> > --
> > 2.31.0
> >
>
> --
> Kees Cook
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