linux-kernel - [PATCH v3 net-next 2/2] net: openvswitch: allow conntrack in non-initial user namespace

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Message-Id: <20220923133820.993725-3-michael.weiss@aisec.fraunhofer.de>
Date:   Fri, 23 Sep 2022 15:38:20 +0200
From:   Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@...ec.fraunhofer.de>
To:     Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@....org>,
        "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
Cc:     Joe Stringer <joe@...ium.io>, Andy Zhou <azhou@....org>,
        Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@...ec.fraunhofer.de>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        dev@...nvswitch.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 net-next 2/2] net: openvswitch: allow conntrack in non-initial user namespace

Similar to the previous commit, the Netlink interface of the OVS
conntrack module was restricted to global CAP_NET_ADMIN by using
GENL_ADMIN_PERM. This is changed to GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM to support
unprivileged containers in non-initial user namespace.

Signed-off-by: Michael Weiß <michael.weiss@...ec.fraunhofer.de>
---
 net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
index 48e8f5c29b67..cb255d8ed99a 100644
--- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
+++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c
@@ -1982,7 +1982,8 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit,
 		} else {
 			struct ovs_ct_limit *ct_limit;
 
-			ct_limit = kmalloc(sizeof(*ct_limit), GFP_KERNEL);
+			ct_limit = kmalloc(sizeof(*ct_limit),
+					   GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 			if (!ct_limit)
 				return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -2252,14 +2253,16 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_get(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
 static const struct genl_small_ops ct_limit_genl_ops[] = {
 	{ .cmd = OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_SET,
 		.validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
-		.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN
-					   * privilege. */
+		.flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN
+					       * privilege.
+					       */
 		.doit = ovs_ct_limit_cmd_set,
 	},
 	{ .cmd = OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_DEL,
 		.validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
-		.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN
-					   * privilege. */
+		.flags = GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM, /* Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN
+					       * privilege.
+					       */
 		.doit = ovs_ct_limit_cmd_del,
 	},
 	{ .cmd = OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_GET,
-- 
2.30.2