linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.19 45/58] netfilter: ebtables: fix memory leak when blob is malformed

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Message-Id: <20220926100743.096771934@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon, 26 Sep 2022 12:12:04 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>,
        syzbot+a24c5252f3e3ab733464@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 45/58] netfilter: ebtables: fix memory leak when blob is malformed

From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>

[ Upstream commit 62ce44c4fff947eebdf10bb582267e686e6835c9 ]

The bug fix was incomplete, it "replaced" crash with a memory leak.
The old code had an assignment to "ret" embedded into the conditional,
restore this.

Fixes: 7997eff82828 ("netfilter: ebtables: reject blobs that don't provide all entry points")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+a24c5252f3e3ab733464@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index ea27bacbd005..59d8974ee92b 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -1003,8 +1003,10 @@ static int do_replace_finish(struct net *net, struct ebt_replace *repl,
 		goto free_iterate;
 	}
 
-	if (repl->valid_hooks != t->valid_hooks)
+	if (repl->valid_hooks != t->valid_hooks) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_unlock;
+	}
 
 	if (repl->num_counters && repl->num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-- 
2.35.1