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Message-Id: <20220927195421.14713-12-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2022 12:53:53 -0700
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@...el.com, paul@...l-moore.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: casey@...aufler-ca.com, linux-audit@...hat.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
john.johansen@...onical.com, penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v38 11/39] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
security module to use for a particular rule.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 +++-
include/linux/security.h | 14 +++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/security.c | 35 +++++++++++---
4 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index db17fc8a0c9f..bac75acc24ba 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
[uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
[fowner=] [fgroup=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
- [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+ [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]
option: [digest_type=] [template=] [permit_directio]
[appraise_type=] [appraise_flag=]
[appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
@@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ Description:
measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+ It is possible to explicitly specify which security
+ module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
+ module specified is not active on the system the rule
+ will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
+ security module registered on the system will be assumed.
+
Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0f0fb2077f41..6ee00f3a10a7 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2012,25 +2012,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot);
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot);
#else
static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- void **lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{ }
#endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a8802b8da946..3ca046129ff0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -93,6 +93,8 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
char *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
+ int rules_lsm; /* which LSM rule applies to */
+ bool lsm_specific; /* true if lsm is specified */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
char *fsname;
struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
@@ -285,6 +287,30 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
}
__setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
+static int default_rules_lsm __ro_after_init = LSMBLOB_INVALID;
+
+static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
+{
+ const char *oldstr;
+ int newdrl;
+
+ newdrl = lsm_name_to_slot(str);
+ if (newdrl >= 0) {
+ default_rules_lsm = newdrl;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ oldstr = lsm_slot_to_name(default_rules_lsm);
+ if (oldstr) {
+ pr_err("default ima rule lsm \"%s\" not registered, continue using \"%s\"",
+ str, oldstr);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
+
static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
{
struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
@@ -356,7 +382,8 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule,
+ entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
}
@@ -407,7 +434,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+ entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm);
if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -623,14 +651,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->lsm[i].rules_lsm);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ rule->lsm[i].rules_lsm);
break;
default:
break;
@@ -1026,7 +1056,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
Opt_digest_type,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
- Opt_label, Opt_err
+ Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
};
static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -1074,6 +1104,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
{Opt_template, "template=%s"},
{Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
+ {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
{Opt_label, "label=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -1093,7 +1124,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules_lsm);
if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1833,6 +1865,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
&(template_desc->num_fields));
entry->template = template_desc;
break;
+ case Opt_lsm: {
+ int i;
+
+ result = lsm_name_to_slot(args[0].from);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+ entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+ entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm = result;
+ entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific = true;
+ }
+ result = 0;
+ break;
+ }
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1878,6 +1927,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
+ int i;
p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
len = strlen(p) + 1;
@@ -1895,6 +1945,11 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+ entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm = default_rules_lsm;
+ entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific = false;
+ }
+
result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
if (result) {
ima_free_rule(entry);
@@ -2205,6 +2260,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
entry->lsm[i].args_p);
break;
}
+ if (entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific)
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm),
+ lsm_slot_to_name(entry->lsm[i].rules_lsm));
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2c197c25746c..b74debe82d82 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2745,19 +2745,42 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
* The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
* the audit subsystem.
*/
-int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
-void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmslot)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot) {
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
}
-int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ int lsmslot)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list)
+ if (hp->lsmid->slot == lsmslot)
+ return hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+ lsmrule);
+
+ return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
--
2.37.3
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