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Message-ID: <YzdPv4+fYX3SG9P0@itl-email>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 16:20:51 -0400
From: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@...isiblethingslab.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Anton Vorontsov <anton@...msg.org>,
Colin Cross <ccross@...roid.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
<marmarek@...isiblethingslab.com>, xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/2] Support ESRT in Xen dom0
On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 09:11:19PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Fri, 30 Sept 2022 at 20:21, Demi Marie Obenour
> <demi@...isiblethingslab.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Sep 30, 2022 at 06:36:11PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> > > On Fri, 30 Sept 2022 at 01:02, Demi Marie Obenour
> > > <demi@...isiblethingslab.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > fwupd requires access to the EFI System Resource Table (ESRT) to
> > > > discover which firmware can be updated by the OS. Currently, Linux does
> > > > not expose the ESRT when running as a Xen dom0. Therefore, it is not
> > > > possible to use fwupd in a Xen dom0, which is a serious problem for e.g.
> > > > Qubes OS.
> > > >
> > > > Before Xen 4.17, this was not fixable due to hypervisor limitations.
> > > > The UEFI specification requires the ESRT to be in EfiBootServicesData
> > > > memory, which Xen will use for whatever purposes it likes. Therefore,
> > > > Linux cannot safely access the ESRT, as Xen may have overwritten it.
> > > >
> > > > Starting with Xen 4.17, Xen checks if the ESRT is in EfiBootServicesData
> > > > or EfiRuntimeServicesData memory. If the ESRT is in EfiBootServicesData
> > > > memory, Xen replaces the ESRT with a copy in memory that it has
> > > > reserved. Such memory is currently of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA,
> > > > but in the future it will be of type EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY. This
> > > > ensures that the ESRT can safely be accessed by the OS.
> > > >
> > > > When running as a Xen dom0, use the new
> > > > xen_config_table_memory_region_max() function to determine if Xen has
> > > > reserved the ESRT and, if so, find the end of the memory region
> > > > containing it. This allows programs such as fwupd which require the
> > > > ESRT to run under Xen, and so makes fwupd support in Qubes OS possible.
> > > >
> > > > Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@...isiblethingslab.com>
> > >
> > > Why do we need this patch? I'd expect esrt_table_exists() to return
> > > false when patch 1/2 is applied.
> >
> > efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP) is false under Xen, so there needs to be an
> > alternative way to get the end of the memory region containing the ESRT.
> > That is what this patch provides.
>
> OK. I don't think we need that to be honest. When running under Xen,
> we should be able to assume that the ESRT does not span multiple
> memory regions arbitrarily, so we can just omit this check if
> !efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)
>
> IIRC (and Peter would know), we are trying to filter out descriptors
> that are completely bogus here: zero lenght, zero address, etc etc. I
> don't think we need that for Xen.
Xen doesn’t uninstall bogus ESRTs, so there is no less reason to worry
under Xen than on bare hardware.
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Invisible Things Lab
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