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Message-ID: <bcfca48f-e02a-fc43-fb92-9cc119e2d28f@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 15:49:18 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
joao.moreira@...el.com, John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
kcc@...gle.com, eranian@...gle.com, rppt@...nel.org,
jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com, dethoma@...rosoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 22/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack
memory
On 10/3/22 11:39, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 03:29:19PM -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
>> [...]
>> Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it
>> does for read-only protections.
>
> As I asked in the cover letter: why do we need to add this for shstk? It
> was a mistake for general memory. :P
For debuggers, which use FOLL_FORCE, quite intentionally, to modify
text. And once a debugger has ptrace write access to a target, shadow
stacks provide exactly no protection -- ptrace can modify text and all
registers.
But /proc/.../mem may be a different story, and I'd be okay with having
FOLL_PROC_MEM for legacy compatibility via /proc/.../mem and not
allowing that to access shadow stacks. This does seem like it may not
be very useful, though.
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