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Message-Id: <20221003070715.827351832@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  3 Oct 2022 09:12:17 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Gou Hao <gouhao@...ontech.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 14/25] ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse

From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>

commit 2bdd737c5687d6dec30e205953146ede8a87dbdd upstream.

Use ima_free_rule() to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry
members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when an error is encountered
during rule parsing.

Set the args_p pointer to NULL after freeing it in the error path of
ima_lsm_rule_init() so that it isn't freed twice.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading an rule that contains an
additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an
invalid conditional:

 # echo "measure fsname=tmpfs bad=cond" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff98e7e4ece6c0 (size 8):
   comm "bash", pid 672, jiffies 4294791843 (age 21.855s)
   hex dump (first 8 bytes):
     74 6d 70 66 73 00 6b a5                          tmpfs.k.
   backtrace:
     [<00000000abab7413>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [<00000000f11ede32>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [<00000000f883dd7a>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [<00000000b17cf753>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [<00000000b8ddfdea>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [<00000000b8e21e87>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [<0000000089ea7b98>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: f1b08bbcbdaf ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0ecedf8 ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@...ux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org> # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Gou Hao <gouhao@...ontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_
 					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
 	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
 		kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+		entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -1034,7 +1035,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
 
 	result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
 	if (result) {
-		kfree(entry);
+		ima_free_rule(entry);
 		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
 				    NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
 				    audit_info);


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