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Message-ID: <202210031203.EB0DC0B7DD@keescook>
Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2022 12:43:57 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Cc: x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
"Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
joao.moreira@...el.com, John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
kcc@...gle.com, eranian@...gle.com, rppt@...nel.org,
jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com, dethoma@...rosoft.com,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 24/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack
support
On Thu, Sep 29, 2022 at 03:29:21PM -0700, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
>
> Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
> A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
> and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
>
> Keep the task's shadow stack address and size in thread_struct. This will
> be copied when cloning new threads, but needs to be cleared during exec,
> so add a function to do this.
>
> Do not support IA32 emulation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
> Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>
> ---
>
> v2:
> - Get rid of unnessary shstk->base checks
> - Don't support IA32 emulation
>
> v1:
> - Switch to xsave helpers.
> - Expand commit log.
>
> Yu-cheng v30:
> - Remove superfluous comments for struct thread_shstk.
> - Replace 'populate' with 'unused'.
>
> Yu-cheng v28:
> - Update shstk_setup() with wrmsrl_safe(), returns success when shadow
> stack feature is not present (since this is a setup function).
>
> arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 13 +++
> arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 11 +++
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 5 ++
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +
> arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 7 files changed, 178 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> index 0fa4dbc98c49..a4a1f4c0089b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
> @@ -7,12 +7,25 @@
>
> struct task_struct;
>
> +struct thread_shstk {
> + u64 base;
> + u64 size;
> +};
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
> long cet_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
> unsigned long features);
> +int shstk_setup(void);
> +void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p);
> +int shstk_disable(void);
> +void reset_thread_shstk(void);
> #else
> static inline long cet_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option,
> unsigned long features) { return -EINVAL; }
> +static inline int shstk_setup(void) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> +static inline void shstk_free(struct task_struct *p) {}
> +static inline int shstk_disable(void) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }
> +static inline void reset_thread_shstk(void) {}
> #endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
shstk_setup() and shstk_disable() are not called outside of shstk.c, so
they can be removed from this header entirely.
>
> #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> index 65ec1965cd28..a9cb4c434e60 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
> @@ -310,6 +310,17 @@ void msrs_free(struct msr *msrs);
> int msr_set_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit);
> int msr_clear_bit(u32 msr, u8 bit);
>
> +static inline void set_clr_bits_msrl(u32 msr, u64 set, u64 clear)
> +{
> + u64 val, new_val;
> +
> + rdmsrl(msr, val);
> + new_val = (val & ~clear) | set;
> +
> + if (new_val != val)
> + wrmsrl(msr, new_val);
> +}
I always get uncomfortable when I see these kinds of generalized helper
functions for touching cpu bits, etc. It just begs for future attacker
abuse to muck with arbitrary bits -- even marked inline there is a risk
the compiler will ignore that in some circumstances (not as currently
used in the code, but I'm imagining future changes leading to such a
condition). Will you humor me and change this to a macro instead? That'll
force it always inline (even __always_inline isn't always inline):
/* Helper that can never get accidentally un-inlined. */
#define set_clr_bits_msrl(msr, set, clear) do { \
u64 __val, __new_val; \
\
rdmsrl(msr, __val); \
__new_val = (__val & ~(clear)) | (set); \
\
if (__new_val != __val) \
wrmsrl(msr, __new_val); \
} while (0)
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
> int rdmsr_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 *l, u32 *h);
> int wrmsr_on_cpu(unsigned int cpu, u32 msr_no, u32 l, u32 h);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> index a92bf76edafe..3a0c9d9d4d1d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ struct vm86;
> #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
> #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>
> #include <asm/vdso/processor.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
>
> #include <linux/personality.h>
> #include <linux/cache.h>
> @@ -533,6 +534,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
> unsigned long features;
> unsigned long features_locked;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
> + struct thread_shstk shstk;
> +#endif
> +
> /* Floating point and extended processor state */
> struct fpu fpu;
> /*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
> index 028158e35269..41af3a8c4fa4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h
> @@ -26,4 +26,6 @@
> #define ARCH_CET_DISABLE 0x4002
> #define ARCH_CET_LOCK 0x4003
>
For readability, maybe add: /* ARCH_CET_* "features" bits */
> +#define CET_SHSTK 0x1
This is UAPI, so the BIT() macro isn't available, but since this is
unsigned long, please use the form: (1ULL << 0) etc...
> +
> #endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> index a20a5ebfacd7..8950d1f71226 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_GUESS) += unwind_guess.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sev.o
>
> +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o
> +
> ###
> # 64 bit specific files
> ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> index 8fa2c2b7de65..be544b4b4c8b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
> @@ -514,6 +514,8 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,
> load_gs_index(__USER_DS);
> }
>
> + reset_thread_shstk();
> +
> loadsegment(fs, 0);
> loadsegment(es, _ds);
> loadsegment(ds, _ds);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> index e3276ac9e9b9..a0b8d4adb2bf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
> @@ -8,8 +8,151 @@
>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/bitops.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mm.h>
> +#include <linux/mman.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
> +#include <linux/compat.h>
> +#include <linux/sizes.h>
> +#include <linux/user.h>
> +#include <asm/msr.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
> +#include <asm/cet.h>
> +#include <asm/special_insns.h>
> +#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
> #include <asm/prctl.h>
>
> +static bool feature_enabled(unsigned long features)
> +{
> + return current->thread.features & features;
> +}
> +
> +static void feature_set(unsigned long features)
> +{
> + current->thread.features |= features;
> +}
> +
> +static void feature_clr(unsigned long features)
> +{
> + current->thread.features &= ~features;
> +}
"feature" vs "features" here is confusing. Should these helpers enforce
the single-bit-set requirements? If so, please switch to a bit number
instead of a mask. If not, please rename these to
"features_{enabled,set,clr}", and fix "features_enabled" to check them
all:
return (current->thread.features & features) == features;
> +static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long size)
> +{
> + int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
> + unsigned long addr, unused;
WARN_ON + clamp on "size" here, or perhaps move the bounds check from
shstk_setup() into here?
> +
> + mmap_write_lock(mm);
> + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_READ, flags,
> + VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE, 0, &unused, NULL);
This will use the mmap base address offset randomization, I guess?
> +
> + mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> +
> + return addr;
> +}
> +
> +static void unmap_shadow_stack(u64 base, u64 size)
> +{
> + while (1) {
> + int r;
> +
> + r = vm_munmap(base, size);
> +
> + /*
> + * vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when mmap_lock is held by
> + * something else, and that lock should not be held for a
> + * long time. Retry it for the case.
> + */
> + if (r == -EINTR) {
> + cond_resched();
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * For all other types of vm_munmap() failure, either the
> + * system is out of memory or there is bug.
> + */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(r);
> + break;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +int shstk_setup(void)
Only called local. Make static?
> +{
> + struct thread_shstk *shstk = ¤t->thread.shstk;
> + unsigned long addr, size;
> +
> + /* Already enabled */
> + if (feature_enabled(CET_SHSTK))
> + return 0;
> +
> + /* Also not supported for 32 bit */
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || in_ia32_syscall())
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + size = PAGE_ALIGN(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G));
> + addr = alloc_shstk(size);
> + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
> + return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
> +
> + fpu_lock_and_load();
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + fpregs_unlock();
> +
> + shstk->base = addr;
> + shstk->size = size;
> + feature_set(CET_SHSTK);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void reset_thread_shstk(void)
> +{
> + memset(¤t->thread.shstk, 0, sizeof(struct thread_shstk));
> + current->thread.features = 0;
> + current->thread.features_locked = 0;
> +}
If features is always going to be tied to shstk, why not put them in the
shstk struct?
Also, shouldn't this also be called from arch_setup_new_exec() instead
of the open-coded wipe of features there?
> +
> +void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
> +
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
> + !feature_enabled(CET_SHSTK))
> + return;
> +
> + if (!tsk->mm)
> + return;
> +
> + unmap_shadow_stack(shstk->base, shstk->size);
I feel like base and size should be zeroed here?
> +}
> +
> +int shstk_disable(void)
This is only called locally. static?
> +{
> + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + /* Already disabled? */
> + if (!feature_enabled(CET_SHSTK))
> + return 0;
> +
> + fpu_lock_and_load();
> + /* Disable WRSS too when disabling shadow stack */
> + set_clr_bits_msrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0, CET_SHSTK_EN);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
> + fpregs_unlock();
> +
> + shstk_free(current);
> + feature_clr(CET_SHSTK);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> long cet_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long features)
> {
> if (option == ARCH_CET_LOCK) {
> --
> 2.17.1
>
--
Kees Cook
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