linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 24/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <202210041229.99F8CB38B@keescook>
Date:   Tue, 4 Oct 2022 12:32:14 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>
Cc:     'Dave Hansen' <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-api@...r.kernel.org" <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        "H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        "Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@...el.com>,
        Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "joao.moreira@...el.com" <joao.moreira@...el.com>,
        John Allen <john.allen@....com>,
        "kcc@...gle.com" <kcc@...gle.com>,
        "eranian@...gle.com" <eranian@...gle.com>,
        "rppt@...nel.org" <rppt@...nel.org>,
        "jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com" <jamorris@...ux.microsoft.com>,
        "dethoma@...rosoft.com" <dethoma@...rosoft.com>,
        Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 24/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack
 support

On Tue, Oct 04, 2022 at 10:17:57AM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Dave Hansen
> > Sent: 03 October 2022 21:05
> > 
> > On 10/3/22 12:43, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >> +static inline void set_clr_bits_msrl(u32 msr, u64 set, u64 clear)
> > >> +{
> > >> +	u64 val, new_val;
> > >> +
> > >> +	rdmsrl(msr, val);
> > >> +	new_val = (val & ~clear) | set;
> > >> +
> > >> +	if (new_val != val)
> > >> +		wrmsrl(msr, new_val);
> > >> +}
> > > I always get uncomfortable when I see these kinds of generalized helper
> > > functions for touching cpu bits, etc. It just begs for future attacker
> > > abuse to muck with arbitrary bits -- even marked inline there is a risk
> > > the compiler will ignore that in some circumstances (not as currently
> > > used in the code, but I'm imagining future changes leading to such a
> > > condition). Will you humor me and change this to a macro instead? That'll
> > > force it always inline (even __always_inline isn't always inline):
> > 
> > Oh, are you thinking that this is dangerous because it's so surgical and
> > non-intrusive?  It's even more powerful to an attacker than, say
> > wrmsrl(), because there they actually have to know what the existing
> > value is to update it.  With this helper, it's quite easy to flip an
> > individual bit without disturbing the neighboring bits.
> > 
> > Is that it?
> > 
> > I don't _like_ the #defines, but doing one here doesn't seem too onerous
> > considering how critical MSRs are.
> 
> How often is the 'msr' number not a compile-time constant?
> Adding rd/wrmsr variants that verify this would reduce the
> attack surface as well.

Oh, yes! I do this all the time with FORTIFY shenanigans. Right, so,
instead of a macro, the "cannot be un-inlined" could be enforced with
this (untested):

static __always_inline void set_clr_bits_msrl(u32 msr, u64 set, u64 clear)
{
	u64 val, new_val;

	BUILD_BUG_ON(!__builtin_constant_p(msr) ||
		     !__builtin_constant_p(set) ||
		     !__builtin_constant_p(clear));

	rdmsrl(msr, val);
	new_val = (val & ~clear) | set;

	if (new_val != val)
		wrmsrl(msr, new_val);
}

-- 
Kees Cook