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Message-ID: <CAHk-=wjjKsSmNVLa1e22Q29-YUEXWtS39d7EDkcN8v_E7SoKGA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2022 14:30:35 -0700
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] LSM patches for v6.1
On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 1:55 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> So this whole "don't do this" approach you have is not acceptable.
Side note: if we have a security hook for "create random file", then
the notion that creating a whole new namespace somehow must not have
any security hooks because it's *so* special is just ridiculous.
I also note that right now USER_NS is both "default n" and "if not
sure, say 'n'" in the Kconfig files, even though obviously that ship
has sailed long ago.
So originally it might have been a reasonable expectation to say "only
enable this if you're doing containers in servers", but that clearly
isn't the case any more. So we basically take USER_NS for granted, but
the fact that people might want chrome to use it for sandboxing does
*not* mean that randomly we want any CLONE_NEWNS to just be ok,
regardless of how trusted (or not) the case is.
Linus
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