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Message-Id: <20221005113211.338588897@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2022 13:32:11 +0200
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@...onical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 23/51] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
commit acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 upstream.
This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it
doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can
just write to SPEC_CTRL directly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@...onical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 31 +------------------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -84,12 +84,6 @@ u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
/*
- * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
- * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
- */
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-
-/*
* AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
* x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
*/
@@ -137,10 +131,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
- /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
- x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-
/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
@@ -198,19 +188,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
{
- u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
+ u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
- /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
- /*
- * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
- * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
- * modifiable bits from the guest value.
- */
- guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
- guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-
if (hostval != guestval) {
msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);
@@ -1543,16 +1524,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
}
/*
- * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
- * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
- * case where the host does not enable it.
- */
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
- static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
- x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
- }
-
- /*
* We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
* - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
* - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
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