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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhSK=oYxV=MzT7BLD3TuzQYiX0aY7h1aPb25wuRN=vPyKg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Oct 2022 09:38:27 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] LSM patches for v6.1
On Wed, Oct 5, 2022 at 8:39 AM Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
> Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
...
> > I'm not saying that an LSM is the only place to do it, but I don't
> > think there have been any better suggestions either.
>
> I don't know. I tried to have the conversation and Paul shut it down.
I would encourage anyone reading the above statement to look at the
previous discussion, links were provided at the top of this thread in
the original pull request.
> Effectively he said that where two or more out of tree LSM policies want
> something it makes no sense to discussion the actual reasons people want
> to use the hook.
Runtime kernel configuration is inherently "out of tree", this
includes not only loadable LSM security policies (e.g. a SELinux
policy), the system's firewall configuration, things like sysctl.conf,
and countless others. Please understand that "out of tree" in this
context is not the same as when it is used in the context of kernel
code; the former is actually a positive thing ("look we can configure
the kernel behavior the way we want!") while the latter is a
maintenance and support nightmare.
--
paul-moore.com
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