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Message-ID: <7856c4c7-2055-1288-049c-043055c6d2c2@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2022 11:16:11 +0200
From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@...onical.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, John Haxby <john.haxby@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] capabilities: new kernel.ns_modules_allowed sysctl
On 8/15/22 17:50, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 10:27:53AM +0200, Vegard Nossum wrote:
>> Creating a new user namespace grants you the ability to reach a lot of code
>> (including loading certain kernel modules) that would otherwise be out of
>> reach of an attacker. We can reduce the attack surface and block exploits
>> by ensuring that user namespaces cannot trigger module (auto-)loading.
[...]
>> + /*
>> + * Disallow if we're in a user namespace and we don't have
>> + * CAP_SYS_MODULE in the init namespace.
>> + */
>> + if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns &&
>> + !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) &&
>
> It's monday, so maybe I'm thinking wrongly - but I don't believe that you can
> possible pass capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE) if current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns.
> So I think you can drop the second check.
Hm, I think I see what you're saying -- cap_capable() will not even
search for caps outside the current_cred() namespace and return -EPERM?
/*
* If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
* we're done searching.
*/
if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level)
return -EPERM;
I'll submit a v3 -- this sysctl is still useful even with the security
hook for userns creation that just got merged.
Thanks,
Vegard
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