linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] KVM: selftests: Test Hyper-V invariant TSC control

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Message-ID: <87v8op6wq3.fsf@ovpn-194-196.brq.redhat.com>
Date:   Wed, 12 Oct 2022 14:40:52 +0200
From:   Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     kvm@...r.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@...hat.com>,
        Michael Kelley <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 6/6] KVM: selftests: Test Hyper-V invariant TSC control

Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> writes:

> On Thu, Sep 22, 2022, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/hyperv_features.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/hyperv_features.c
>> index d4bd18bc580d..18b44450dfb8 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/hyperv_features.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86_64/hyperv_features.c
>> @@ -46,20 +46,33 @@ struct hcall_data {
>>  
>>  static void guest_msr(struct msr_data *msr)
>>  {
>> -	uint64_t ignored;
>> +	uint64_t msr_val = 0;
>>  	uint8_t vector;
>>  
>>  	GUEST_ASSERT(msr->idx);
>>  
>> -	if (!msr->write)
>> -		vector = rdmsr_safe(msr->idx, &ignored);
>> -	else
>> +	if (!msr->write) {
>> +		vector = rdmsr_safe(msr->idx, &msr_val);
>
> This is subtly going to do weird things if the RDMSR faults.  rdmsr_safe()
> overwrites @val with whatever happens to be in EDX:EAX if the RDMSR faults, i.e.
> this may yield garbage instead of '0'.  Arguably rdmsr_safe() is a bad API, but
> at the same time the caller really shouldn't consume the result if RDMSR faults
> (though aligning with the kernel is also valuable).
>
> Aha!  Idea.  Assuming none of the MSRs are write-only, what about adding a prep
> patch to rework this code so that it verifies RDMSR returns what was written when
> a fault didn't occur.
>

There is at least one read-only MSR which comes to mind:
HV_X64_MSR_EOI. Also, some of the MSRs don't preserve the written value,
e.g. HV_X64_MSR_RESET which always reads as '0'.

I do, however, like the additional check that RDMSR returns what was
written to the MSR, we will just need an additional flag in 'struct
msr_data' ('check_written_value' maybe?).

-- 
Vitaly