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Message-ID: <087931d7-4639-afde-fce3-bf916201ec3e@amd.com>
Date:   Thu, 13 Oct 2022 10:00:49 -0500
From:   "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>
To:     Alper Gun <alpergun@...gle.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
        jroedel@...e.de, thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com,
        ardb@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com,
        vkuznets@...hat.com, jmattson@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org,
        dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, slp@...hat.com, pgonda@...gle.com,
        peterz@...radead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com,
        rientjes@...gle.com, dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com,
        bp@...en8.de, michael.roth@....com, vbabka@...e.cz,
        kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com, tony.luck@...el.com,
        marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
        dgilbert@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 41/49] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle the RMP
 nested page fault

On 10/12/2022 5:53 PM, Alper Gun wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 10, 2022 at 7:32 PM Kalra, Ashish <ashish.kalra@....com> wrote:
>>
>> Hello Alper,
>>
>> On 10/10/2022 5:03 PM, Alper Gun wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jun 20, 2022 at 4:13 PM Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>>
>>>> When SEV-SNP is enabled in the guest, the hardware places restrictions on
>>>> all memory accesses based on the contents of the RMP table. When hardware
>>>> encounters RMP check failure caused by the guest memory access it raises
>>>> the #NPF. The error code contains additional information on the access
>>>> type. See the APM volume 2 for additional information.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@....com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>    arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 14 +++++---
>>>>    2 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>> index 4ed90331bca0..7fc0fad87054 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>> @@ -4009,3 +4009,79 @@ void sev_post_unmap_gfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
>>>>
>>>>           spin_unlock(&sev->psc_lock);
>>>>    }
>>>> +
>>>> +void handle_rmp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code)
>>>> +{
>>>> +       int rmp_level, npt_level, rc, assigned;
>>>> +       struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>>>> +       gfn_t gfn = gpa_to_gfn(gpa);
>>>> +       bool need_psc = false;
>>>> +       enum psc_op psc_op;
>>>> +       kvm_pfn_t pfn;
>>>> +       bool private;
>>>> +
>>>> +       write_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
>>>> +
>>>> +       if (unlikely(!kvm_mmu_get_tdp_walk(vcpu, gpa, &pfn, &npt_level)))
>>>> +               goto unlock;
>>>> +
>>>> +       assigned = snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &rmp_level);
>>>> +       if (unlikely(assigned < 0))
>>>> +               goto unlock;
>>>> +
>>>> +       private = !!(error_code & PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK);
>>>> +
>>>> +       /*
>>>> +        * If the fault was due to size mismatch, or NPT and RMP page level's
>>>> +        * are not in sync, then use PSMASH to split the RMP entry into 4K.
>>>> +        */
>>>> +       if ((error_code & PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK) ||
>>>> +           (npt_level == PG_LEVEL_4K && rmp_level == PG_LEVEL_2M && private)) {
>>>> +               rc = snp_rmptable_psmash(kvm, pfn);
>>>
>>>
>>> Regarding this case:
>>> RMP level is 4K
>>> Page table level is 2M
>>>
>>> Does this also cause a page fault with size mismatch? If so, we
>>> shouldn't try psmash because the rmp entry is already 4K.
>>>
>>> I see these errors in our tests and I think it may be happening
>>> because rmp size is already 4K.
>>>
>>> [ 1848.752952] psmash failed, gpa 0x191560000 pfn 0x536cd60 rc 7
>>> [ 2922.879635] psmash failed, gpa 0x102830000 pfn 0x37c8230 rc 7
>>> [ 3010.983090] psmash failed, gpa 0x104220000 pfn 0x6cf1e20 rc 7
>>> [ 3170.792050] psmash failed, gpa 0x108a80000 pfn 0x20e0080 rc 7
>>> [ 3345.955147] psmash failed, gpa 0x11b480000 pfn 0x1545e480 rc 7
>>>
>>> Shouldn't we use AND instead of OR in the if statement?
>>>
>>
>> I believe this we can't do, looking at the typical usage case below :
>>
>> [   37.243969] #VMEXIT (NPF) - SIZEM, err 0xc80000005 npt_level 2,
>> rmp_level 2, private 1
>> [   37.243973] trying psmash gpa 0x7f790000 pfn 0x1f5d90
>>
>> This is typically the case with #VMEXIT(NPF) with SIZEM error code, when
>> the guest tries to do PVALIDATE on 4K GHCB pages, in this case both the
>> RMP table and NPT will be optimally setup to 2M hugepage as can be seen.
>>
>> Is it possible to investigate in more depth, when is the this case being
>> observed:
> 
> Yes, I added more logs and I can see that these errors happen when RMP
> level is 4K and NPT level is 2M.
> psmash fails as expected. I think it is just a log, there is no real
> issue but the best is not trying psmash if rmp level is 4K.
> 

Now, the SIZEM bit is only set when PVALIDATE or RMPADJUST fails due to
guest attempting to validate a 4K page that is backed by a 2MB RMP 
entry, which is not the case here as RMP level is 4K.

Also, this does not fall into the second case for the same reason.

#NPF will happen during Guest page table walk if RMP checks fail
for 2M nested page and RMP.SubPage_Count !=0 OR
RMP.PageSize != Nested table page size, but then that shouldn't have
the SIZEM fault bit set.

This raises concern about some existing race condition, it probably
can race with
snp_handle_page_state_change()->snp_make_page_shared()->snp_rmptable_psmash(),
but that code path seems to be protected from this nested RMP #PF 
handler as they both acquire the kvm->mmu_lock.

So, this still needs more investigation.

Can you share what kind of tests are you running to reproduce this
issue ?

Thanks,
Ashish

>> RMP level is 4K
>> Page table level is 2M
>> We shouldn't try psmash because the rmp entry is already 4K.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Ashish
>>
>>> if ((error_code & PFERR_GUEST_SIZEM_MASK) && ...
>>>

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