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Message-Id: <20221017194447.2579441-1-jane.chu@oracle.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2022 13:44:47 -0600
From: Jane Chu <jane.chu@...cle.com>
To: pmladek@...e.com, rostedt@...dmis.org, senozhatsky@...omium.org,
andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com, linux@...musvillemoes.dk,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: jane.chu@...cle.com
Subject: [PATCH v2] vsprintf: protect kernel from panic due to non-canonical pointer dereference
While debugging a separate issue, it was found that an invalid string
pointer could very well contain a non-canical address, such as
0x7665645f63616465. In that case, this line of defense isn't enough
to protect the kernel from crashing due to general protection fault
if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
return "(efault)";
So run one more round of check via kern_addr_valid(). On architectures
that provide meaningful implementation, this line of check effectively
catches non-canonical pointers, etc.
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@...cle.com>
---
lib/vsprintf.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index c414a8d9f1ea..b38c12ef1e45 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -698,6 +698,9 @@ static const char *check_pointer_msg(const void *ptr)
if ((unsigned long)ptr < PAGE_SIZE || IS_ERR_VALUE(ptr))
return "(efault)";
+ if (!kern_addr_valid((unsigned long)ptr))
+ return "(efault)";
+
return NULL;
}
--
2.18.4
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