linux-kernel - [PATCH 6.0 204/862] userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O

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Date:   Wed, 19 Oct 2022 10:24:51 +0200
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Robert OCallahan <roc@...llahan.org>,
        Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
        Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>,
        "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@...nel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.0 204/862] userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY

From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>

[ Upstream commit abec3d015fdfb7c63105c7e1c956188bf381aa55 ]

Since userfaultfd doesn't implement a write operation, it is more
appropriate to open it read-only.

When userfaultfds are opened read-write like it is now, and such fd is
passed from one process to another, SELinux will check both read and
write permissions for the target process, even though it can't actually
do any write operation on the fd later.

Inspired by the following bug report, which has hit the SELinux scenario
described above:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1974559

Reported-by: Robert O'Callahan <roc@...llahan.org>
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@...hat.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 fs/userfaultfd.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
index 175de70e3adf..0c1d33c4f74c 100644
--- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
+++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
@@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ static int resolve_userfault_fork(struct userfaultfd_ctx *new,
 	int fd;
 
 	fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, new,
-			O_RDWR | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
+			O_RDONLY | (new->flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), inode);
 	if (fd < 0)
 		return fd;
 
@@ -2094,7 +2094,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
 	mmgrab(ctx->mm);
 
 	fd = anon_inode_getfd_secure("[userfaultfd]", &userfaultfd_fops, ctx,
-			O_RDWR | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
+			O_RDONLY | (flags & UFFD_SHARED_FCNTL_FLAGS), NULL);
 	if (fd < 0) {
 		mmdrop(ctx->mm);
 		kmem_cache_free(userfaultfd_ctx_cachep, ctx);
-- 
2.35.1