linux-kernel - [PATCH] virt: Prevent AES-GCM IV reuse in SNP guest driver

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Message-Id: <20221019150333.1047423-1-pgonda@google.com>
Date:   Wed, 19 Oct 2022 08:03:33 -0700
From:   Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
To:     thomas.lendacky@....com
Cc:     Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
        Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Haowen Bai <baihaowen@...zu.com>,
        Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@...wei.com>,
        Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] virt: Prevent AES-GCM IV reuse in SNP guest driver

The ASP and an SNP guest use a series of AES-GCM keys called VMPCKs to
communicate securely with each other. The IV to this scheme is a
sequence number that both the ASP and the guest track. Currently this
sequence number in a guest request must exactly match the sequence
number tracked by the ASP. This means that if the guest sees an error
from the host during a request it can only retry that exact request or
disable the VMPCK to prevent an IV reuse. AES-GCM cannot tolerate IV
reuse see:
https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/block-cipher-techniques/documents/bcm/comments/800-38-series-drafts/gcm/joux_comments.pdf

Fixes: fce96cf044308 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver")
Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
Reported-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Cc: Haowen Bai <baihaowen@...zu.com>
Cc: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@...wei.com>
Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org

---
 drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index f422f9c58ba7..227ae6a10ef2 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -67,8 +67,27 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 	return true;
 }
 
+/*
+ * If we receive an error from the host or ASP we have two options. We can
+ * either retry the exact same encrypted request or we can discontinue using the
+ * VMPCK.
+ *
+ * This is because in the current encryption scheme GHCB v2 uses AES-GCM to
+ * encrypt the requests. The IV for this scheme is the sequence number. GCM
+ * cannot tolerate IV reuse.
+ *
+ * The ASP FW v1.51 only increments the sequence numbers on a successful
+ * guest<->ASP back and forth and only accepts messages at its exact sequence
+ * number.
+ *
+ * So if we were to reuse the sequence number the encryption scheme is
+ * vulnerable. If we encrypt the sequence number for a fresh IV the ASP will
+ * reject our request.
+ */
 static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 {
+	dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id: %d to prevent IV reuse.\n",
+		  vmpck_id);
 	memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
 	snp_dev->vmpck = NULL;
 }
@@ -326,29 +345,29 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
 	if (fw_err)
 		*fw_err = err;
 
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
+			  "Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, fw_err: %lu\n",
+			  rc, fw_err);
+		goto disable_vmpck;
+	}
 
-	/*
-	 * The verify_and_dec_payload() will fail only if the hypervisor is
-	 * actively modifying the message header or corrupting the encrypted payload.
-	 * This hints that hypervisor is acting in a bad faith. Disable the VMPCK so that
-	 * the key cannot be used for any communication. The key is disabled to ensure
-	 * that AES-GCM does not use the same IV while encrypting the request payload.
-	 */
 	rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz);
 	if (rc) {
 		dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
-			  "Detected unexpected decode failure, disabling the vmpck_id %d\n",
-			  vmpck_id);
-		snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
-		return rc;
+			  "Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc: %d\n",
+			  rc);
+		goto disable_vmpck;
 	}
 
 	/* Increment to new message sequence after payload decryption was successful. */
 	snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
 
 	return 0;
+
+disable_vmpck:
+	snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
-- 
2.38.0.413.g74048e4d9e-goog