linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data

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Message-ID: <Y1TPPOuF4qm4eHTx@kernel.org>
Date:   Sun, 23 Oct 2022 08:21:00 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To:     Nikolaus Voss <nv@...n.de>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Yael Tzur <yaelt@...gle.com>,
        Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@...e.cz>, Petr Vorel <pvorel@...e.cz>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with
 user-provided data

On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 08:18:58AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 08:39:58AM +0200, Nikolaus Voss wrote:
> > Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided
> > decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data.
> > The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer.
> > Fix this to use hex2bin instead.
> > 
> > Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe"
> > are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the
> > old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a
> > small shell script, e.g.:
> > 
> > BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa
> > NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
> > keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u
> > keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u
> > 
> > It is encouraged to switch to a new key because the effective key size
> > of the old keys is only half of the specified size.
> > 
> > The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been
> > fixed (see link below).
> > 
> > Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")
> > Cc: stable <stable@...nel.org>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/
> > Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@...g-streit.com>
> > ---
> > Changes
> > =======
> > v4: - fixed link
> > v3: - use generated random key in example, reformat commit message
> > v2: - clarify commit message, add example to recover old/broken keys
> >     - improve example in Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> >     - add link to ltp patch
> > 
> >  Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 3 ++-
> >  security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c          | 6 +++---
> >  2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > index 0bfb4c339748..9bc9db8ec651 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
> > @@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::
> >  
> >  Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::
> >  
> > -    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u
> > +    $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p)
> > +    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u
> >      794890253
> >  
> >      $ keyctl print 794890253
> > diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> > index e05cfc2e49ae..1e313982af02 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> > +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
> > @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
> >  			pr_err("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n");
> >  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> >  		}
> > -		if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
> > +		if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen * 2) {
> >  			pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
> >  			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> >  		}
> > @@ -791,8 +791,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
> >  		ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv);
> >  	} else if (decrypted_data) {
> >  		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
> > -		memcpy(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
> > -				   epayload->decrypted_datalen);
> > +		ret = hex2bin(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
> > +			      epayload->decrypted_datalen);
> >  	} else {
> >  		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
> >  		get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
> > -- 
> > 2.34.1
> > 
> 
> 
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
> 
> Unless there is opposing views, I can pick this.

Actually, taking this back: please fix the checkpatch warnings first.

BR, Jarkko