[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <b772127d-8729-553a-000c-27cf4ddbf926@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 09:14:45 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/mm: Do not verify W^X at boot up
On 10/24/22 08:45, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
> @@ -587,6 +587,10 @@ static inline pgprot_t verify_rwx(pgprot_t old, pgprot_t new, unsigned long star
> {
> unsigned long end;
>
> + /* Kernel text is rw at boot up */
> + if (system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING)
> + return new;
Hi Steven,
Thanks for the report and the patch. That seems reasonable, but I'm a
bit worried that it opens up a big hole (boot time) when a W+X mapping
could be created *anywhere*.
Could we restrict this bypass to *only* kernel text addresses during
boot? Maybe something like this:
if ((system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING) &&
__kernel_text_address(start))
return new;
That would be safe because we know that kernel_text_address() addresses
will be made read-only by the time userspace shows up and that
is_kernel_inittext() addresses will be freed.
Long-term, I wonder if we could teach the early patching code that it
can't just use memcpy().
Powered by blists - more mailing lists