linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function

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Message-ID: <CA+fCnZeTO_eQjSqysoToKCqUhsXc8jL93TdE8W9Fh+xrbUiFtg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 27 Oct 2022 21:15:54 +0200
From:   Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>,
        Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function

On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 9:13 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Oct 27, 2022 at 09:05:45PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> > On Sat, Oct 22, 2022 at 8:08 PM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> > [...]
> > > -/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
> > > +/* Check that ksize() does NOT unpoison whole object. */
> > >  static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> > >  {
> > >         char *ptr;
> > > @@ -791,15 +791,17 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> > >
> > >         ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> > >         KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> > > +
> > >         real_size = ksize(ptr);
> > > +       KUNIT_EXPECT_GT(test, real_size, size);
> > >
> > >         OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
> > >
> > >         /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
> > > -       ptr[size] = 'x';
> > > +       ptr[size - 1] = 'x';
> > >
> > >         /* This one must. */
> > > -       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
> > > +       KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size - 1]);
> >
> > How about also accessing ptr[size] here? It would allow for a more
> > precise checking of the in-object redzone.
>
> Sure! Probably both ptr[size] and ptr[real_size -1], yes?

Yes, sounds good. Thank you!