linux-kernel - [PATCH 0/2] x86/tdx: Enforce no #VE on private memory accesses

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Message-Id: <20221028141220.29217-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 28 Oct 2022 17:12:18 +0300
From:   "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To:     tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
        dave.hansen@...el.com, luto@...nel.org, peterz@...radead.org
Cc:     sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com, ak@...ux.intel.com,
        dan.j.williams@...el.com, david@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com,
        seanjc@...gle.com, thomas.lendacky@....com,
        elena.reshetova@...el.com, x86@...nel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] x86/tdx: Enforce no #VE on private memory accesses

As described in 9a22bf6debbf ("x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX
guest"), kernel relies on "no #VE on access to private memory" to keep
guest secure from attacks against syscall gap or NMI entry code.

SEPT_VE_DISABLE TD attribute controls TDX module behaviour on EPT
violation.

The attribute must be set to avoid #VE. Refuse to boot the guest if it
is not.

Kirill A. Shutemov (1):
  x86/tdx: Do not allow #VE due to EPT violation on the private memory

Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan (1):
  x86/tdx: Extract GET_INFO call from get_cc_mask()

 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

-- 
2.38.0