linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 14/49] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled

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Message-ID: <dc89b2f4-1053-91ac-aeac-bb3b25f9ebc7@amd.com>
Date:   Mon, 31 Oct 2022 16:58:38 -0500
From:   "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>
To:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc:     vbabka@...e.cz, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, jroedel@...e.de,
        thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com, ardb@...nel.org,
        pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
        jmattson@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
        slp@...hat.com, pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
        srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
        dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com, tobin@....com, michael.roth@....com,
        kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com, tony.luck@...el.com,
        marcorr@...gle.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
        alpergun@...gle.com, dgilbert@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
        "Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH Part2 v6 14/49] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR
 allocation when SNP is enabled

Hello Boris,

On 10/31/2022 4:15 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2022 at 03:10:16PM -0500, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>> Just to add here, writing to any of these pages from the Host
>> will trigger a RMP #PF which will cause the RMP page fault handler
>> to send a SIGBUS to the current process, as this page is not owned
>> by Host.
> 
> And kill the host process?
> 
> So this is another "policy" which sounds iffy. If we kill the process,
> we should at least say why. Are we doing that currently?

Yes, pasted below is the latest host RMP #PF handler, with new and 
additional comments added and there is a relevant comment added here for 
this behavior:

static int handle_user_rmp_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned 
long error_code,unsigned long address)
{
...
...

     /*
      * If its a guest private page, then the fault cannot be resolved.
      * Send a SIGBUS to terminate the process.
      *
      * As documented in APM vol3 pseudo-code for RMPUPDATE, when the
      * 2M range is covered by a valid (Assigned=1) 2M entry, the middle
      * 511 4k entries also have Assigned=1. This means that if there is
      * an access to a page which happens to lie within an Assigned 2M
      * entry, the 4k RMP entry will also have Assigned=1. Therefore, the
      * kernel should see that the page is not a valid page and the fault
      * cannot be resolved.
      */
      if (snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &rmp_level)) {
             do_sigbus(regs, error_code, address, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS);
             return RMP_PF_RETRY;
      }
...
...

I believe that we already had an off-list discussion on the same, 
copying David Kaplan's reply on the same below:

So what I think you want to do is:
1. Compute the pfn for the 4kb page you're trying to access (as your 
code below does) 2. Read that RMP entry -- If it is assigned then kill 
the process 3. Otherwise, check the level from the host page table.  If 
level=PG_LEVEL_4K then somebody else may have already smashed this page, 
so just retry the instruction 4. If level=PG_LEVEL_2M/1G, then the host 
needs to split their page.

This is the current algorithm being followed by the host RMP #PF handler.

> 
>> So calling memory_failure() is proactively doing the same, marking the
>> page as poisoned and probably also killing the current process.
> 
> But the page is not suffering a memory failure - it cannot be reclaimed
> for whatever reason. Btw, how can that reclaim failure ever happen? Any
> real scenarios?

The scenarios here are either SNP FW failure (SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM command) 
in transitioning the page back to HV state and/or RMPUPDATE instruction 
failure to transition the page back to hypervisor/shared state.

> 
> Anyway, memory failure just happens to fit what you wanna do but you
> can't just reuse that - that's hacky. What is the problem with writing
> your own function which does that?
> 

Ok.

Will look at adding our own recovery function for the same, but that 
will again mark the pages as poisoned, right ?

Still waiting for some/more feedback from mm folks on the same.

Thanks,
Ashish

> Also, btw, please do not top-post.
> 
> Thx.
>