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Message-ID: <20221102231911.3107438-14-seanjc@google.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Nov 2022 23:18:40 +0000
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@...nel.org>,
Aleksandar Markovic <aleksandar.qemu.devel@...il.com>,
Anup Patel <anup@...infault.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
Janosch Frank <frankja@...ux.ibm.com>,
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@...ux.ibm.com>,
Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@...ux.ibm.com>,
Eric Farman <farman@...ux.ibm.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@....com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
Atish Patra <atishp@...shpatra.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, kvm-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
Fabiano Rosas <farosas@...ux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH 13/44] KVM: x86: Serialize vendor module initialization
(hardware setup)
Acquire a new mutex, vendor_module_lock, in kvm_x86_vendor_init() while
doing hardware setup to ensure that concurrent calls are fully serialized.
KVM rejects attempts to load vendor modules if a different module has
already been loaded, but doesn't handle the case where multiple vendor
modules are loaded at the same time, and module_init() doesn't run under
the global module_mutex.
Note, in practice, this is likely a benign bug as no platform exists that
supports both SVM and VMX, i.e. barring a weird VM setup, one of the
vendor modules is guaranteed to fail a support check before modifying
common KVM state.
Alternatively, KVM could perform an atomic CMPXCHG on .hardware_enable,
but that comes with its own ugliness as it would require setting
.hardware_enable before success is guaranteed, e.g. attempting to load
the "wrong" could result in spurious failure to load the "right" module.
Introduce a new mutex as using kvm_lock is extremely deadlock prone due
to kvm_lock being taken under cpus_write_lock(), and in the future, under
under cpus_read_lock(). Any operation that takes cpus_read_lock() while
holding kvm_lock would potentially deadlock, e.g. kvm_timer_init() takes
cpus_read_lock() to register a callback. In theory, KVM could avoid
such problematic paths, i.e. do less setup under kvm_lock, but avoiding
all calls to cpus_read_lock() is subtly difficult and thus fragile. E.g.
updating static calls also acquires cpus_read_lock().
Inverting the lock ordering, i.e. always taking kvm_lock outside
cpus_read_lock(), is not a viable option, e.g. kvm_online_cpu() takes
kvm_lock and is called under cpus_write_lock().
The lockdep splat below is dependent on future patches to take
cpus_read_lock() in hardware_enable_all(), but as above, deadlock is
already is already possible.
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.0.0-smp--7ec93244f194-init2 #27 Tainted: G O
------------------------------------------------------
stable/251833 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffffc097ea28 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hardware_enable_all+0x1f/0xc0 [kvm]
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffa2456828 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: hardware_enable_all+0xf/0xc0 [kvm]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
cpus_read_lock+0x2a/0xa0
__cpuhp_setup_state+0x2b/0x60
__kvm_x86_vendor_init+0x16a/0x1870 [kvm]
kvm_x86_vendor_init+0x23/0x40 [kvm]
0xffffffffc0a4d02b
do_one_initcall+0x110/0x200
do_init_module+0x4f/0x250
load_module+0x1730/0x18f0
__se_sys_finit_module+0xca/0x100
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x1d/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #0 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire+0x16f4/0x30d0
lock_acquire+0xb2/0x190
__mutex_lock+0x98/0x6f0
mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
hardware_enable_all+0x1f/0xc0 [kvm]
kvm_dev_ioctl+0x45e/0x930 [kvm]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x77/0xc0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1d/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
lock(kvm_lock);
lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
lock(kvm_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by stable/251833:
#0: ffffffffa2456828 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: hardware_enable_all+0xf/0xc0 [kvm]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index a0ca401d3cdf..218707597bea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_do_singlestep(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static int __set_sregs2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs2 *sregs2);
static void __get_sregs2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_sregs2 *sregs2);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(vendor_module_lock);
struct kvm_x86_ops kvm_x86_ops __read_mostly;
#define KVM_X86_OP(func) \
@@ -9280,7 +9281,7 @@ void kvm_arch_exit(void)
}
-int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
+static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
{
u64 host_pat;
int r;
@@ -9413,6 +9414,17 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
kmem_cache_destroy(x86_emulator_cache);
return r;
}
+
+int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
+{
+ int r;
+
+ mutex_lock(&vendor_module_lock);
+ r = __kvm_x86_vendor_init(ops);
+ mutex_unlock(&vendor_module_lock);
+
+ return r;
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_x86_vendor_init);
void kvm_x86_vendor_exit(void)
@@ -9435,7 +9447,6 @@ void kvm_x86_vendor_exit(void)
cancel_work_sync(&pvclock_gtod_work);
#endif
static_call(kvm_x86_hardware_unsetup)();
- kvm_x86_ops.hardware_enable = NULL;
kvm_mmu_vendor_module_exit();
free_percpu(user_return_msrs);
kmem_cache_destroy(x86_emulator_cache);
@@ -9443,6 +9454,9 @@ void kvm_x86_vendor_exit(void)
static_key_deferred_flush(&kvm_xen_enabled);
WARN_ON(static_branch_unlikely(&kvm_xen_enabled.key));
#endif
+ mutex_lock(&vendor_module_lock);
+ kvm_x86_ops.hardware_enable = NULL;
+ mutex_unlock(&vendor_module_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_x86_vendor_exit);
--
2.38.1.431.g37b22c650d-goog
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