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Message-ID: <CAKwvOdkdeLEvtOmX423oYaWCami0kAFatWe25DdJq7gbmGb+5g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2022 10:48:37 -0700
From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>
To: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@...cinc.com>
Cc: oberpar@...ux.ibm.com, nathan@...nel.org, trix@...hat.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, llvm@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH] gcov: clang: fix the buffer overflow issue
On Fri, Nov 4, 2022 at 6:23 AM Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@...cinc.com> wrote:
>
> Currently, in clang version of gcov code when module is getting removed
> gcov_info_add() incorrectly adds the sfn_ptr->counter to all the
> dst->functions and it result in the kernel panic in below crash report.
> Fix this by properly handling it.
>
> [ 8.899094][ T599] Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffffff80461cc000
> [ 8.899100][ T599] Mem abort info:
> [ 8.899102][ T599] ESR = 0x9600004f
> [ 8.899103][ T599] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
> [ 8.899105][ T599] SET = 0, FnV = 0
> [ 8.899107][ T599] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
> [ 8.899108][ T599] FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault
> [ 8.899110][ T599] Data abort info:
> [ 8.899111][ T599] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f
> [ 8.899113][ T599] CM = 0, WnR = 1
> [ 8.899114][ T599] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000ab8de000
> [ 8.899116][ T599] [ffffff80461cc000] pgd=18000009ffcde003, p4d=18000009ffcde003, pud=18000009ffcde003, pmd=18000009ffcad003, pte=00600000c61cc787
> [ 8.899124][ T599] Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP
> [ 8.899265][ T599] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0
> ....
> ..,
> [ 8.899544][ T599] CPU: 7 PID: 599 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G S OE 5.15.41-android13-8-g38e9b1af6bce #1
> [ 8.899547][ T599] Hardware name: XXX (DT)
> [ 8.899549][ T599] pstate: 82400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
> [ 8.899551][ T599] pc : gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8
> [ 8.899557][ T599] lr : gcov_event+0x28c/0x6b8
> [ 8.899559][ T599] sp : ffffffc00e733b00
> [ 8.899560][ T599] x29: ffffffc00e733b00 x28: ffffffc00e733d30 x27: ffffffe8dc297470
> [ 8.899563][ T599] x26: ffffffe8dc297000 x25: ffffffe8dc297000 x24: ffffffe8dc297000
> [ 8.899566][ T599] x23: ffffffe8dc0a6200 x22: ffffff880f68bf20 x21: 0000000000000000
> [ 8.899569][ T599] x20: ffffff880f68bf00 x19: ffffff8801babc00 x18: ffffffc00d7f9058
> [ 8.899572][ T599] x17: 0000000000088793 x16: ffffff80461cbe00 x15: 9100052952800785
> [ 8.899575][ T599] x14: 0000000000000200 x13: 0000000000000041 x12: 9100052952800785
> [ 8.899577][ T599] x11: ffffffe8dc297000 x10: ffffffe8dc297000 x9 : ffffff80461cbc80
> [ 8.899580][ T599] x8 : ffffff8801babe80 x7 : ffffffe8dc2ec000 x6 : ffffffe8dc2ed000
> [ 8.899583][ T599] x5 : 000000008020001f x4 : fffffffe2006eae0 x3 : 000000008020001f
> [ 8.899586][ T599] x2 : ffffff8027c49200 x1 : ffffff8801babc20 x0 : ffffff80461cb3a0
> [ 8.899589][ T599] Call trace:
> [ 8.899590][ T599] gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8
> [ 8.899592][ T599] gcov_module_notifier+0xbc/0x120
> [ 8.899595][ T599] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xa0/0x11c
> [ 8.899598][ T599] do_init_module+0x2a8/0x33c
> [ 8.899600][ T599] load_module+0x23cc/0x261c
> [ 8.899602][ T599] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x158/0x194
> [ 8.899604][ T599] invoke_syscall+0x94/0x2bc
> [ 8.899607][ T599] el0_svc_common+0x1d8/0x34c
> [ 8.899609][ T599] do_el0_svc+0x40/0x54
> [ 8.899611][ T599] el0_svc+0x94/0x2f0
> [ 8.899613][ T599] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
> [ 8.899615][ T599] el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8
> [ 8.899618][ T599] Code: f905f56c f86e69ec f86e6a0f 8b0c01ec (f82e6a0c)
> [ 8.899620][ T599] ---[ end trace ed5218e9e5b6e2e6 ]---
>
> Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@...cinc.com>
> ---
> kernel/gcov/clang.c | 13 +++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/gcov/clang.c b/kernel/gcov/clang.c
> index cbb0bed..0aabb9a 100644
> --- a/kernel/gcov/clang.c
> +++ b/kernel/gcov/clang.c
> @@ -271,15 +271,20 @@ int gcov_info_is_compatible(struct gcov_info *info1, struct gcov_info *info2)
> */
> void gcov_info_add(struct gcov_info *dst, struct gcov_info *src)
> {
> - struct gcov_fn_info *dfn_ptr;
> - struct gcov_fn_info *sfn_ptr = list_first_entry_or_null(&src->functions,
> - struct gcov_fn_info, head);
Hi Mukesh,
Thanks for the report and patch!
Looking closer at the existing implementation, it looks curious to me
that we use list_first_entry_or_null() since that may return NULL,
which we never check for. I'm curious if that's safe to remove?
Probably, since we haven't had any issues reported thus far.
> + struct gcov_fn_info *sfn_ptr;
> + struct gcov_fn_info *dfn_ptr = list_first_entry_or_null(
> + &dst->functions, struct gcov_fn_info, head);
>
> - list_for_each_entry(dfn_ptr, &dst->functions, head) {
> + list_for_each_entry(sfn_ptr, &src->functions, head) {
This seems to be iterating BOTH src and dest, whereas previously we
were only iterating dest AFAICT. Is this correct? Seems to be a
change of behavior, at the least, which seems orthogonal to fixing the
panic.
Otherwise it sounds like we could just add NULL ptr checks against
sfn_ptr outside the loop, and against dfn_ptr inside the loop.
Something like this?
```
diff --git a/kernel/gcov/clang.c b/kernel/gcov/clang.c
index cbb0bed958ab..5d4cb801aa9c 100644
--- a/kernel/gcov/clang.c
+++ b/kernel/gcov/clang.c
@@ -275,10 +275,13 @@ void gcov_info_add(struct gcov_info *dst, struct
gcov_info *src)
struct gcov_fn_info *sfn_ptr = list_first_entry_or_null(&src->functions,
struct gcov_fn_info, head);
- list_for_each_entry(dfn_ptr, &dst->functions, head) {
- u32 i;
+ if (!sfn_ptr)
+ return;
- for (i = 0; i < sfn_ptr->num_counters; i++)
+ list_for_each_entry(dfn_ptr, &dst->functions, head) {
+ if (!dfn_ptr)
+ continue;
+ for (u32 i = 0, e = sfn_ptr->num_counters; i != e; ++i)
dfn_ptr->counters[i] += sfn_ptr->counters[i];
}
}
```
Can you test the above hunk or comment on whether it addresses the issue?
> u32 i;
>
> + if (!dfn_ptr)
> + return;
> +
> for (i = 0; i < sfn_ptr->num_counters; i++)
> dfn_ptr->counters[i] += sfn_ptr->counters[i];
> +
> + dfn_ptr = list_next_entry(dfn_ptr, head);
> }
> }
>
> --
> 2.7.4
>
--
Thanks,
~Nick Desaulniers
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