linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/speculation: Support Automatic IBRS under virtualization

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Date:   Tue, 8 Nov 2022 16:48:12 -0600
From:   Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>
To:     Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>
Cc:     x86@...nel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@...cle.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@....com>,
        Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86/speculation: Support Automatic IBRS under
 virtualization

On 11/7/22 4:42 PM, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 7, 2022 at 2:29 PM Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com> wrote:
>>
>> On 11/4/22 5:00 PM, Jim Mattson wrote:
>>> On Fri, Nov 4, 2022 at 2:38 PM Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> VM Guests may want to use Auto IBRS, so propagate the CPUID to them.
>>>>
>>>> Co-developed-by: Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@....com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>
>>>
>>> The APM says that, under AutoIBRS, CPL0 processes "have IBRS
>>> protection." I'm taking this to mean only that indirect branches in
>>> CPL0 are not subject to steering from a less privileged predictor
>>> mode. This would imply that indirect branches executed at CPL0 in L1
>>> could potentially be subject to steering by code running at CPL0 in
>>> L2, since L1 and L2 share hardware predictor modes.
>>
>> That's true for AMD processors that don't support Same Mode IBRS, also
>> documented in the APM.
>>
>> Processors that support AutoIBRS also support Same Mode IBRS (see
>> CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX[IbrsSameMode] (bit 19)).
>>
>>> Fortunately, there is an IBPB when switching VMCBs in svm_vcpu_load().
>>> But it might be worth noting that this is necessary for AutoIBRS to
>>> work (unless it actually isn't).
>>
>> It is needed, but not for kernel/CPL0 code, rather to protect one
>> guest's user-space code from another's.
> 
> The question is whether it's necessary when switching between L1 and
> L2 on the same vCPU of the same VM.
> 
> On the Intel side, this was (erroneously) optimized away in commit
> 5c911beff20a ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and
> vmcs02").

Then why hasn't it been reverted?

Does its rationale not make sense?:

     The IBPB is intended to prevent one guest from attacking another, which
     is unnecessary in the nested case as it's the same guest from KVM's
     perspective.

Thanks,

Kim