linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv11.1 04/16] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch

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Message-ID: <6782d309-5e4b-580c-fbbb-4388bda69bf3@kernel.org>
Date:   Tue, 8 Nov 2022 19:54:35 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To:     "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        dave.hansen@...el.com
Cc:     ak@...ux.intel.com, andreyknvl@...il.com, ashok.raj@...el.com,
        bharata@....com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, dvyukov@...gle.com,
        glider@...gle.com, hjl.tools@...il.com,
        jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com, kcc@...gle.com,
        kirill@...temov.name, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, peterz@...radead.org,
        rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, ryabinin.a.a@...il.com,
        tarasmadan@...gle.com, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv11.1 04/16] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch

On 11/7/22 13:35, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Linear Address Masking mode for userspace pointers encoded in CR3 bits.
> The mode is selected per-process and stored in mm_context_t.
> 
> switch_mm_irqs_off() now respects selected LAM mode and constructs CR3
> accordingly.
> 
> The active LAM mode gets recorded in the tlb_state.
> 

> +static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> +	return mm->context.lam_cr3_mask;

READ_ONCE -- otherwise this has a data race and might generate sanitizer 
complaints.

> +}

> @@ -491,6 +496,8 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
>   {
>   	struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
>   	u16 prev_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
> +	unsigned long prev_lam = tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask();
> +	unsigned long new_lam = mm_lam_cr3_mask(next);

So I'm reading this again after drinking a cup of coffee.  new_lam is 
next's LAM mask according to mm_struct (and thus can change 
asynchronously due to a remote CPU).  prev_lam is based on tlbstate and 
can't change asynchronously, at least not with IRQs off.


>   	bool was_lazy = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate_shared.is_lazy);
>   	unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
>   	u64 next_tlb_gen;
> @@ -520,7 +527,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
>   	 * isn't free.
>   	 */
>   #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
> -	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid))) {
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid, prev_lam))) {

So is the only purpose of tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask() to enable this warning 
to work?

>   		/*
>   		 * If we were to BUG here, we'd be very likely to kill
>   		 * the system so hard that we don't see the call trace.
> @@ -552,9 +559,15 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
>   	 * instruction.
>   	 */
>   	if (real_prev == next) {
> +		/* Not actually switching mm's */
>   		VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) !=
>   			   next->context.ctx_id);
>   
> +		/*
> +		 * If this races with another thread that enables lam, 'new_lam'
> +		 * might not match 'prev_lam'.
> +		 */
> +

Indeed.

>   		/*
>   		 * Even in lazy TLB mode, the CPU should stay set in the
>   		 * mm_cpumask. The TLB shootdown code can figure out from
> @@ -622,15 +635,16 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
>   		barrier();
>   	}

> @@ -691,6 +705,10 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void)
>   	/* Assert that CR3 already references the right mm. */
>   	WARN_ON((cr3 & CR3_ADDR_MASK) != __pa(mm->pgd));
>   
> +	/* LAM expected to be disabled in CR3 and init_mm */
> +	WARN_ON(cr3 & (X86_CR3_LAM_U48 | X86_CR3_LAM_U57));
> +	WARN_ON(mm_lam_cr3_mask(&init_mm));
> +

I think the callers all have init_mm selected, but the rest of this 
function is not really written with this assumption.  (But it does force 
ASID 0, which is at least a bizarre thing to do for non-init-mm.)

What's the purpose of this warning?  I'm okay with keeping it, but maybe 
also add a warning that fires if mm != &init_mm.