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Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 13:09:37 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@....com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@...cle.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Tony Luck <tony.luck@...el.com>,
Babu Moger <Babu.Moger@....com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] x86/speculation: Support Automatic IBRS
On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 04:39:02PM -0600, Kim Phillips wrote:
> I've started a version that has AUTOIBRS reuse SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS
> spectre_v2_mitigation enum, but, so far, it's change to bugs.c
> looks bigger: 58 lines changed vs. 34 (see below).
It can be smaller. You simply do:
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
and the rest should just work - see below.
And yes, as Peter says, when the user requests something, the user
should get it. No matter whether it makes sense or not.
Thx.
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 66d7addf1784..2b77eaee9bd2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
#endif
#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_AMD_MSG "WARNING: AutoIBRS does not need additional RETPOLINE/LFENCE mitigations, not doing them\n"
#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
#define SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG "WARNING: IBRS mitigation selected on Enhanced IBRS CPU, this may cause unnecessary performance loss\n"
@@ -1124,6 +1125,7 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
+/* Checks for IBRS versions */
static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
@@ -1229,7 +1231,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines",
[SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE",
- [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
@@ -1247,6 +1249,7 @@ static const struct {
{ "retpoline,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false },
{ "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
{ "eibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false },
+ { "autoibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false },
{ "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false },
{ "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false },
{ "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
@@ -1300,7 +1303,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
- pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have Enhanced or Automatic IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
@@ -1474,11 +1477,19 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_AMD_MSG);
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+ } else
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
- mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_AMD_MSG);
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+ } else
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
break;
}
@@ -1486,8 +1497,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
- x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
- write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) {
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
+ } else {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+ }
}
switch (mode) {
@@ -1571,8 +1586,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
/*
* Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
* and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
- * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
- * enabled.
+ * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't
+ * otherwise enabled.
*
* Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
* the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 73cc546e024d..45e3670bdaaf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1341,6 +1344,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+ /* AMDs AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel flag. */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+
if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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