Message-ID: <3e50c258-8732-088c-d9d8-dfaae82213f0@amd.com>
Date:   Wed, 16 Nov 2022 13:02:14 -0600
From:   Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To:     Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
Cc:     Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
        Haowen Bai <baihaowen@...zu.com>,
        Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@...wei.com>,
        Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>,
        Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>, stable@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V5] virt: sev: Prevent IV reuse in SNP guest driver

On 11/16/22 11:55, Peter Gonda wrote:
> The AMD Secure Processor (ASP) and an SNP guest use a series of
> AES-GCM keys called VMPCKs to communicate securely with each other.
> The IV to this scheme is a sequence number that both the ASP and the
> guest track. Currently this sequence number in a guest request must
> exactly match the sequence number tracked by the ASP. This means that
> if the guest sees an error from the host during a request it can only
> retry that exact request or disable the VMPCK to prevent an IV reuse.
> AES-GCM cannot tolerate IV reuse see: "Authentication Failures in NIST
> version of GCM" - Antoine Joux et al.
> 
> In order to address this make handle_guest_request() delete the VMPCK
> on any non successful return. To allow userspace querying the cert_data
> length make handle_guest_request() safe the number of pages required by

s/safe/save/

> the host, then handle_guest_request() retry the request without

... then have handle_guest_request() ...

> requesting the extended data, then return the number of pages required
> back to userspace.
> 
> Fixes: fce96cf044308 ("virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver")
> Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>
> Reported-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@...gle.com>

Just some nits on the commit message and comments below, otherwise

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>

> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
> Cc: Haowen Bai <baihaowen@...zu.com>
> Cc: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@...wei.com>
> Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@...gle.com>
> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
> Cc: Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>
> Cc: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@....com>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org
> ---
>   drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
>   1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> index f422f9c58ba79..64b4234c14da8 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> @@ -67,8 +67,27 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
>   	return true;
>   }
>   
> +/*
> + * If an error is received from the host or AMD Secure Processor (ASP) there
> + * are two options. Either retry the exact same encrypted request or discontinue
> + * using the VMPCK.
> + *
> + * This is because in the current encryption scheme GHCB v2 uses AES-GCM to
> + * encrypt the requests. The IV for this scheme is the sequence number. GCM
> + * cannot tolerate IV reuse.
> + *
> + * The ASP FW v1.51 only increments the sequence numbers on a successful
> + * guest<->ASP back and forth and only accepts messages at its exact sequence
> + * number.
> + *
> + * So if the sequence number were to be reused the encryption scheme is
> + * vulnerable. If the sequence number were incremented for a fresh IV the ASP
> + * will reject the request.
> + */
>   static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
>   {
> +	dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id: %d to prevent IV reuse.\n",
> +		  vmpck_id);
>   	memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
>   	snp_dev->vmpck = NULL;
>   }
> @@ -321,34 +340,70 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in
>   	if (rc)
>   		return rc;
>   
> -	/* Call firmware to process the request */
> +	/*
> +	 * Call firmware to process the request. In this function the encrypted
> +	 * message enters shared memory with the host. So after this call the
> +	 * sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to
> +	 * prevent reuse of the IV.
> +	 */
>   	rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If the extended guest request fails due to having too small of a
> +	 * certificate data buffer retry the same guest request without the
> +	 * extended data request in order to not have to reuse the IV.

... in order to increment the sequence number to avoid reuse of the IV.

> +	 */
> +	if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST &&
> +	    err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN) {
> +		const unsigned int certs_npages = snp_dev->input.data_npages;
> +
> +		exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * If this call to the firmware succeeds the sequence number can
> +		 * be incremented allowing for continued use of the VMPCK. If
> +		 * there is an error reflected in the return value, this value
> +		 * is checked further down and the result will be the deletion
> +		 * of the VMPCK and the error code being propagated back to the
> +		 * user as an IOCLT return code.

s/IOCLT/ioctl()/

Thanks,
Tom

> +		 */
> +		rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Override the error to inform callers the given extended
> +		 * request buffer size was too small and give the caller the
> +		 * required buffer size.
> +		 */
> +		err = SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN;
> +		snp_dev->input.data_npages = certs_npages;
> +	}
> +
>   	if (fw_err)
>   		*fw_err = err;
>   
> -	if (rc)
> -		return rc;
> +	if (rc) {
> +		dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
> +			  "Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, fw_err: %llu\n",
> +			  rc, *fw_err);
> +		goto disable_vmpck;
> +	}
>   
> -	/*
> -	 * The verify_and_dec_payload() will fail only if the hypervisor is
> -	 * actively modifying the message header or corrupting the encrypted payload.
> -	 * This hints that hypervisor is acting in a bad faith. Disable the VMPCK so that
> -	 * the key cannot be used for any communication. The key is disabled to ensure
> -	 * that AES-GCM does not use the same IV while encrypting the request payload.
> -	 */
>   	rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz);
>   	if (rc) {
>   		dev_alert(snp_dev->dev,
> -			  "Detected unexpected decode failure, disabling the vmpck_id %d\n",
> -			  vmpck_id);
> -		snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
> -		return rc;
> +			  "Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc: %d\n",
> +			  rc);
> +		goto disable_vmpck;
>   	}
>   
>   	/* Increment to new message sequence after payload decryption was successful. */
>   	snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev);
>   
>   	return 0;
> +
> +disable_vmpck:
> +	snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev);
> +	return rc;
>   }
>   
>   static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)

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