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Message-ID: <CANiDSCvyQ66mXbhEgj_qnE_zR4frsxtu1bXaukDrEG0FjrE4yw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 16:15:07 +0100
From: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@...omium.org>
To: Philipp Rudo <prudo@...hat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
Ross Zwisler <zwisler@...nel.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
"Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@...lfernandes.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] kexec: Introduce kexec_reboot_disabled
Hi Philipp
Thanks for your review!
On Thu, 17 Nov 2022 at 16:07, Philipp Rudo <prudo@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Ricardo,
>
> all in all I think this patch makes sense. However, there is one point
> I don't like...
>
> On Mon, 14 Nov 2022 14:18:39 +0100
> Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@...omium.org> wrote:
>
> > Create a new toogle that disables LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC, reducing the
> > attack surface to a system.
> >
> > Without this toogle, an attacker can only reboot into a different kernel
> > if they can create a panic().
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@...omium.org>
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> > index 97394bd9d065..25d019682d33 100644
> > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
> > @@ -462,6 +462,17 @@ altered.
> > Generally used together with the `modules_disabled`_ sysctl.
> >
> >
> > +kexec_reboot_disabled
> > +=====================
> > +
> > +A toggle indicating if ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` has been disabled.
> > +This value defaults to 0 (false: ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` enabled),
> > +but can be set to 1 (true: ``LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC`` disabled).
> > +Once true, kexec can no longer be used for reboot and the toggle
> > +cannot be set back to false.
> > +This toggle does not affect the use of kexec during a crash.
> > +
> > +
> > kptr_restrict
> > =============
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
> > index 41a686996aaa..15c3fad8918b 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kexec.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
> > @@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ extern int kimage_crash_copy_vmcoreinfo(struct kimage *image);
> > extern struct kimage *kexec_image;
> > extern struct kimage *kexec_crash_image;
> > extern int kexec_load_disabled;
> > +extern int kexec_reboot_disabled;
> >
> > #ifndef kexec_flush_icache_page
> > #define kexec_flush_icache_page(page)
> > diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
> > index cb8e6e6f983c..43063f803d81 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kexec.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
> > @@ -196,6 +196,10 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
> > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
> > return -EPERM;
> >
> > + /* Check if the system admin has disabled kexec reboot. */
> > + if (!(flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) && kexec_reboot_disabled)
> > + return -EPERM;
>
> ... Allowing to load a crashkernel doesn't make sense in my opinion. If
> an attacker is capable of creating a malicious kernel, planting it on
> the victims system and then find a way to boot it via kexec this
> attacker also knows how to load the malicious kernel as crashkernel and
> trigger a panic. So you haven't really gained anything. That's why I
> would simply drop this hunk (and the corresponding one from
> kexec_file_load) and let users who worry about this use a combination of
> kexec_load_disabled and kexec_reboot_disabled.
If for whatever reason your sysadmin configured kexec_reboot_disabed
it can be nice that when a user try to load it they get a warning.
It is easier to debug than waiting two steps later when they run kexec -e....
That is why I added it. But i am also ok removing it
>
> Thanks
> Philipp
>
> > +
> > /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */
> > result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE, false);
> > if (result < 0)
> > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c
> > index ca2743f9c634..fe82e2525705 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c
> > @@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ int kimage_load_segment(struct kimage *image,
> > struct kimage *kexec_image;
> > struct kimage *kexec_crash_image;
> > int kexec_load_disabled;
> > +int kexec_reboot_disabled;
> > #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> > static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] = {
> > {
> > @@ -941,6 +942,16 @@ static struct ctl_table kexec_core_sysctls[] = {
> > .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
> > .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
> > },
> > + {
> > + .procname = "kexec_reboot_disabled",
> > + .data = &kexec_reboot_disabled,
> > + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> > + .mode = 0644,
> > + /* only handle a transition from default "0" to "1" */
> > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> > + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
> > + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
> > + },
> > { }
> > };
> >
> > @@ -1138,7 +1149,7 @@ int kernel_kexec(void)
> >
> > if (!kexec_trylock())
> > return -EBUSY;
> > - if (!kexec_image) {
> > + if (!kexec_image || kexec_reboot_disabled) {
> > error = -EINVAL;
> > goto Unlock;
> > }
> > diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> > index 45637511e0de..583fba6de5cb 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> > @@ -333,6 +333,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
> > if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
> > return -EPERM;
> >
> > + /* Check if the system admin has disabled kexec reboot. */
> > + if (!(flags & (KEXEC_FILE_ON_CRASH | KEXEC_FILE_UNLOAD))
> > + && kexec_reboot_disabled)
> > + return -EPERM;
> > +
> > /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */
> > if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
>
--
Ricardo Ribalda
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