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Message-ID: <a84234d8-9f48-4b8f-e171-599c34840581@suse.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 14:33:16 +0100
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@...e.com>
To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
<marmarek@...isiblethingslab.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@...nel.org>,
Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@...m.com>,
"moderated list:XEN HYPERVISOR INTERFACE"
<xen-devel@...ts.xenproject.org>, David Vrabel <dvrabel@...tab.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] xen-pciback: Consider MSI-X enabled only when MASKALL bit
is cleared
On 17.11.2022 14:13, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 17, 2022 at 12:54:51PM +0000, David Vrabel wrote:
>> On 17/11/2022 11:41, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>>> Linux enables MSI-X before disabling INTx, but keeps MSI-X masked until
>>> the table is filled. Then it disables INTx just before clearing MASKALL
>>> bit. Currently this approach is rejected by xen-pciback.
>>> Allow setting PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE while INTx is still enabled as long
>>> as PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL is set too.
>>
>> The use of MSI-X interrupts is conditional on only the MSI-X Enable bit.
>> Setting MSI-X Enable effectively overrides the Interrupt Disable bit in the
>> Command register.
>
> That means the second chunk of the patch may even drop the '(new_value &
> PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL)' part, right?
>
>> PCIe 6.0.1 section 7.7.2.2. "MSI-X Enable ... is prohibited from using INTx
>> interrupts (if implemented)." And there is similar wording for MSI Enable.
>
> And this would mean the 'field_config->int_type == INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSIX'
> part isn't necessary either.
>
> Jan in another thread pointed out that disabling INTx explicitly is
> still a useful workaround for a flawed hardware. But if that isn't
> mandated by the spec, maybe it doesn't need to be enforced by pciback
> either?
Well, allowing a device to go into a mode exhibiting undefined behavior
is what we ought to prevent when it comes to a DomU doing so vs overall
host safety.
Jan
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