Message-Id: <20221118035656.gonna.698-kees@kernel.org>
Date:   Thu, 17 Nov 2022 19:56:57 -0800
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>,
        David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>,
        Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>,
        Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>,
        Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function

With all "silently resizing" callers of ksize() refactored, remove the
logic in ksize() that would allow it to be used to effectively change
the size of an allocation (bypassing __alloc_size hints, etc). Users
wanting this feature need to either use kmalloc_size_roundup() before an
allocation, or use krealloc() directly.

For kfree_sensitive(), move the unpoisoning logic inline. Replace the
some of the partially open-coded ksize() in __do_krealloc with ksize()
now that it doesn't perform unpoisoning.

Adjust the KUnit tests to match the new ksize() behavior.

Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@...ux.dev>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@...il.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>
Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org
Cc: kasan-dev@...glegroups.com
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
v2:
- improve kunit test precision (andreyknvl)
- add Ack (vbabka)
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221022180455.never.023-kees@kernel.org
---
 mm/kasan/kasan_test.c | 14 +++++++++-----
 mm/slab_common.c      | 26 ++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
index 7502f03c807c..fc4b22916587 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
 	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
 }
 
-/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
+/* Check that ksize() does NOT unpoison whole object. */
 static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
 {
 	char *ptr;
@@ -829,15 +829,19 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
 
 	ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
+
 	real_size = ksize(ptr);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_GT(test, real_size, size);
 
 	OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
 
-	/* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
-	ptr[size] = 'x';
+	/* These accesses shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
+	ptr[0] = 'x';
+	ptr[size - 1] = 'x';
 
-	/* This one must. */
-	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
+	/* These must trigger a KASAN report. */
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
+	KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size - 1]);
 
 	kfree(ptr);
 }
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index 8276022f0da4..27caa57af070 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -1335,11 +1335,11 @@ __do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, gfp_t flags)
 	void *ret;
 	size_t ks;
 
-	/* Don't use instrumented ksize to allow precise KASAN poisoning. */
+	/* Check for double-free before calling ksize. */
 	if (likely(!ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(p))) {
 		if (!kasan_check_byte(p))
 			return NULL;
-		ks = kfence_ksize(p) ?: __ksize(p);
+		ks = ksize(p);
 	} else
 		ks = 0;
 
@@ -1407,21 +1407,21 @@ void kfree_sensitive(const void *p)
 	void *mem = (void *)p;
 
 	ks = ksize(mem);
-	if (ks)
+	if (ks) {
+		kasan_unpoison_range(mem, ks);
 		memzero_explicit(mem, ks);
+	}
 	kfree(mem);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(kfree_sensitive);
 
 size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 {
-	size_t size;
-
 	/*
-	 * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid, and
-	 * only then unpoison the memory. The report printed from ksize() is
-	 * more useful, then when it's printed later when the behaviour could
-	 * be undefined due to a potential use-after-free or double-free.
+	 * We need to first check that the pointer to the object is valid.
+	 * The KASAN report printed from ksize() is more useful, then when
+	 * it's printed later when the behaviour could be undefined due to
+	 * a potential use-after-free or double-free.
 	 *
 	 * We use kasan_check_byte(), which is supported for the hardware
 	 * tag-based KASAN mode, unlike kasan_check_read/write().
@@ -1435,13 +1435,7 @@ size_t ksize(const void *objp)
 	if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(objp)) || !kasan_check_byte(objp))
 		return 0;
 
-	size = kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
-	/*
-	 * We assume that ksize callers could use whole allocated area,
-	 * so we need to unpoison this area.
-	 */
-	kasan_unpoison_range(objp, size);
-	return size;
+	return kfence_ksize(objp) ?: __ksize(objp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ksize);
 
-- 
2.34.1

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