Date:   Sat, 19 Nov 2022 13:09:28 +0100
From:   "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, patches@...ts.linux.dev
Cc:     "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
        linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org>,
        Carlos O'Donell <carlos@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 2/3] random: introduce generic vDSO getrandom() implementation

Provide a generic C vDSO getrandom() implementation, which operates on
an opaque state returned by vgetrandom_alloc() and produces random bytes
the same way as getrandom(). This has a the API signature:

  ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state);

The return value and the first 3 arguments are the same as ordinary
getrandom(), while the last argument is a pointer to the opaque
allocated state. Were all four arguments passed to the getrandom()
syscall, nothing different would happen, and the functions would have
the exact same behavior.

The actual vDSO RNG algorithm implemented is the same one implemented by
drivers/char/random.c, using the same fast-erasure techniques as that.
Should the in-kernel implementation change, so too will the vDSO one.

Initially, the state is keyless, and so the first call makes a
getrandom() syscall to generate that key, and then uses it for
subsequent calls. By keeping track of a generation counter, it knows
when its key is invalidated and it should fetch a new one using the
syscall. Later, more than just a generation counter might be used.

Since MADV_WIPEONFORK is set on the opaque state, the key and related
state is wiped during a fork(), so secrets don't roll over into new
processes, and the same state doesn't accidentally generate the same
random stream. The generation counter, as well, is always >0, so that
the 0 counter is a useful indication of a fork() or otherwise
uninitialized state.

If the kernel RNG is not yet initialized, then the vDSO always calls the
syscall, because that behavior cannot be emulated in userspace, but
fortunately that state is short lived and only during early boot. If it
has been initialized, then there is no need to inspect the `flags`
argument, because the behavior does not change post-initialization
regardless of the `flags` value.

Together with the previous commit that introduces vgetrandom_alloc(),
this functionality is intended to be integrated into libc's thread
management. As an illustrative example, the following code might be used
to do the same outside of libc. All of the static functions are to be
considered implementation private, including the vgetrandom_alloc()
syscall wrapper, which generally shouldn't be exposed outside of libc,
with the non-static vgetrandom() function at the end being the exported
interface. The various pthread-isms are expected to be elided into libc
internals. This per-thread allocation scheme is very naive and does not
shrink; other implementations may choose to be more complex.

  static void *vgetrandom_alloc(size_t *num, size_t *size_per_each, unsigned int flags)
  {
    unsigned long ret = syscall(__NR_vgetrandom_alloc, num, size_per_each, flags);
    return ret > -4096UL ? NULL : (void *)ret;
  }

  static struct {
    pthread_mutex_t lock;
    void **states;
    size_t len, cap;
  } grnd_allocator = {
    .lock = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER
  };

  static void *vgetrandom_get_state(void)
  {
    void *state = NULL;

    pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
    if (!grnd_allocator.len) {
      size_t new_cap, size_per_each, num = 16; /* Just a hint. */
      void *new_block = vgetrandom_alloc(&num, &size_per_each, 0), *new_states;

      if (!new_block)
        goto out;
      new_cap = grnd_allocator.cap + num;
      new_states = reallocarray(grnd_allocator.states, new_cap, sizeof(*grnd_allocator.states));
      if (!new_states) {
        munmap(new_block, num * size_per_each);
        goto out;
      }
      grnd_allocator.cap = new_cap;
      grnd_allocator.states = new_states;

      for (size_t i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
        grnd_allocator.states[i] = new_block;
        new_block += size_per_each;
      }
      grnd_allocator.len = num;
    }
    state = grnd_allocator.states[--grnd_allocator.len];

  out:
    pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
    return state;
  }

  static void vgetrandom_put_state(void *state)
  {
    if (!state)
      return;
    pthread_mutex_lock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
    grnd_allocator.states[grnd_allocator.len++] = state;
    pthread_mutex_unlock(&grnd_allocator.lock);
  }

  static struct {
    ssize_t(*fn)(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags, void *state);
    pthread_key_t key;
    pthread_once_t initialized;
  } grnd_ctx = {
    .initialized = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT
  };

  static void vgetrandom_init(void)
  {
    if (pthread_key_create(&grnd_ctx.key, vgetrandom_put_state) != 0)
      return;
    grnd_ctx.fn = __vdsosym("LINUX_2.6", "__vdso_getrandom");
  }

  ssize_t vgetrandom(void *buf, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
  {
    void *state;

    pthread_once(&grnd_ctx.initialized, vgetrandom_init);
    if (!grnd_ctx.fn)
      return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
    state = pthread_getspecific(grnd_ctx.key);
    if (!state) {
      state = vgetrandom_get_state();
      if (pthread_setspecific(grnd_ctx.key, state) != 0) {
        vgetrandom_put_state(state);
        state = NULL;
      }
      if (!state)
        return getrandom(buf, len, flags);
    }
    return grnd_ctx.fn(buf, len, flags, state);
  }

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
---
 MAINTAINERS             |   1 +
 drivers/char/random.c   |   5 ++
 include/vdso/datapage.h |   6 +++
 lib/crypto/chacha.c     |   4 ++
 lib/vdso/Kconfig        |   5 ++
 lib/vdso/getrandom.c    | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 136 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 lib/vdso/getrandom.c

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 843dd6a49538..e0aa33f54c57 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -17287,6 +17287,7 @@ T:	git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/char/random.c
 F:	drivers/virt/vmgenid.c
+F:	lib/vdso/getrandom.c
 F:	lib/vdso/getrandom.h
 
 RAPIDIO SUBSYSTEM
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index ab6e02efa432..7dfdbf424c92 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
 #include <asm/irq.h>
 #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
+#include <vdso/datapage.h>
 #include "../../lib/vdso/getrandom.h"
 
 /*********************************************************************
@@ -307,6 +308,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work)
 	if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
 		++next_gen;
 	WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM))
+		smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.generation, next_gen + 1);
 	if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready))
 		crng_init = CRNG_READY;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
@@ -756,6 +759,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
 		crng_reseed(NULL); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
 		if (static_key_initialized)
 			execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM))
+			smp_store_release(&_vdso_rng_data.is_ready, true);
 		wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
 		kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
 		pr_notice("crng init done\n");
diff --git a/include/vdso/datapage.h b/include/vdso/datapage.h
index 73eb622e7663..cbacfd923a5c 100644
--- a/include/vdso/datapage.h
+++ b/include/vdso/datapage.h
@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ struct vdso_data {
 	struct arch_vdso_data	arch_data;
 };
 
+struct vdso_rng_data {
+	unsigned long generation;
+	bool is_ready;
+};
+
 /*
  * We use the hidden visibility to prevent the compiler from generating a GOT
  * relocation. Not only is going through a GOT useless (the entry couldn't and
@@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ struct vdso_data {
  */
 extern struct vdso_data _vdso_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
 extern struct vdso_data _timens_data[CS_BASES] __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
+extern struct vdso_rng_data _vdso_rng_data __attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
 
 /*
  * The generic vDSO implementation requires that gettimeofday.h
diff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha.c b/lib/crypto/chacha.c
index b748fd3d256e..944991bb36c7 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha.c
@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@ static void chacha_permute(u32 *x, int nrounds)
 {
 	int i;
 
+#ifndef CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE
 	/* whitelist the allowed round counts */
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(nrounds != 20 && nrounds != 12);
+#endif
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nrounds; i += 2) {
 		x[0]  += x[4];    x[12] = rol32(x[12] ^ x[0],  16);
@@ -87,6 +89,7 @@ void chacha_block_generic(u32 *state, u8 *stream, int nrounds)
 
 	state[12]++;
 }
+#ifndef CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha_block_generic);
 
 /**
@@ -112,3 +115,4 @@ void hchacha_block_generic(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
 	memcpy(&stream[4], &x[12], 16);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_generic);
+#endif
diff --git a/lib/vdso/Kconfig b/lib/vdso/Kconfig
index d883ac299508..c35fac664574 100644
--- a/lib/vdso/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/vdso/Kconfig
@@ -30,4 +30,9 @@ config GENERIC_VDSO_TIME_NS
 	  Selected by architectures which support time namespaces in the
 	  VDSO
 
+config HAVE_VDSO_GETRANDOM
+	bool
+	help
+	  Selected by architectures that support vDSO getrandom().
+
 endif
diff --git a/lib/vdso/getrandom.c b/lib/vdso/getrandom.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8bef1e92a79d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/vdso/getrandom.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <vdso/datapage.h>
+#include <asm/vdso/getrandom.h>
+#include <asm/vdso/vsyscall.h>
+#include "getrandom.h"
+
+#undef memcpy
+#define memcpy(d,s,l) __builtin_memcpy(d,s,l)
+#undef memset
+#define memset(d,c,l) __builtin_memset(d,c,l)
+
+#define CHACHA_FOR_VDSO_INCLUDE
+#include "../crypto/chacha.c"
+
+static void memcpy_and_zero(void *dst, void *src, size_t len)
+{
+#define CASCADE(type) \
+	while (len >= sizeof(type)) { \
+		*(type *)dst = *(type *)src; \
+		*(type *)src = 0; \
+		dst += sizeof(type); \
+		src += sizeof(type); \
+		len -= sizeof(type); \
+	}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+	CASCADE(u64);
+#endif
+	CASCADE(u32);
+	CASCADE(u16);
+#endif
+	CASCADE(u8);
+#undef CASCADE
+}
+
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+__cvdso_getrandom_data(const struct vdso_rng_data *rng_info, void *buffer, size_t len,
+		       unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
+{
+	ssize_t ret = min_t(size_t, MAX_RW_COUNT, len);
+	struct vgetrandom_state *state = opaque_state;
+	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
+	unsigned long current_generation;
+	size_t batch_len;
+
+	if (unlikely(!rng_info->is_ready))
+		return getrandom_syscall(buffer, len, flags);
+
+	if (unlikely(!len))
+		return 0;
+
+retry_generation:
+	current_generation = READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation);
+	if (unlikely(state->generation != current_generation)) {
+		if (getrandom_syscall(state->key, sizeof(state->key), 0) != sizeof(state->key))
+			return getrandom_syscall(buffer, len, flags);
+		WRITE_ONCE(state->generation, current_generation);
+		state->pos = sizeof(state->batch);
+	}
+
+	len = ret;
+more_batch:
+	batch_len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(state->batch) - state->pos, len);
+	if (batch_len) {
+		memcpy_and_zero(buffer, state->batch + state->pos, batch_len);
+		state->pos += batch_len;
+		buffer += batch_len;
+		len -= batch_len;
+	}
+	if (!len) {
+		/*
+		 * Since rng_info->generation will never be 0, we re-read state->generation,
+		 * rather than using the local current_generation variable, to learn whether
+		 * we forked.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(state->generation) != READ_ONCE(rng_info->generation))) {
+			buffer -= ret;
+			goto retry_generation;
+		}
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
+	memcpy(&chacha_state[4], state->key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+	memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+
+	while (len >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+		chacha20_block(chacha_state, buffer);
+		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+			++chacha_state[13];
+		buffer += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		len -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	chacha20_block(chacha_state, state->key_batch);
+	if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+		++chacha_state[13];
+	chacha20_block(chacha_state, state->key_batch + CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	state->pos = 0;
+	memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+	goto more_batch;
+}
+
+static __always_inline ssize_t
+__cvdso_getrandom(void *buffer, size_t len, unsigned int flags, void *opaque_state)
+{
+	return __cvdso_getrandom_data(__arch_get_vdso_rng_data(), buffer, len, flags, opaque_state);
+}
-- 
2.38.1

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