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Message-ID: <20221121103956.04abbe9b@gandalf.local.home>
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2022 10:39:56 -0500
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@...a.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Florent Revest <revest@...omium.org>,
bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>, markowsky@...gle.com,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...wei.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/1] BPF tracing for arm64 using fprobe
On Mon, 21 Nov 2022 16:29:54 +0100
KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org> wrote:
> I am not sure how they can circumvent security since this needs root /
> root equivalent permissions. Fault injection is actually a very useful
> debugging tool.
On ChromeOS, we even consider root untrusted and lock down pretty
much all privileged activities (like loading modules and such).
As you said. It's a good debugging tool. Not something to allow in
production environments. Or at the very least, allow admins to disable it.
-- Steve
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