linux-kernel - [PATCH v3 2/5] efi: stub: use random seed from EFI variable

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Date:   Tue, 22 Nov 2022 03:04:01 +0100
From:   "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To:     linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        patches@...ts.linux.dev, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        ardb@...nel.org
Cc:     "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/5] efi: stub: use random seed from EFI variable

EFI has a rather unique benefit that it has access to some limited
non-volatile storage, where the kernel can store a random seed. Read
that seed in EFISTUB and concatenate it with other seeds we wind up
passing onward to the kernel in the configuration table. This is
complementary to the current other two sources - previous bootloaders,
and the EFI RNG protocol.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com>
---
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c
index f85d2c066877..64aa6e7f3a17 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/random.c
@@ -68,13 +68,23 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void)
 	efi_guid_t rng_algo_raw = EFI_RNG_ALGORITHM_RAW;
 	efi_guid_t rng_table_guid = LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID;
 	struct linux_efi_random_seed *prev_seed, *seed = NULL;
-	int prev_seed_size = 0, seed_size = EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
+	u8 nv_seed[EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+	unsigned long prev_seed_size = 0, nv_seed_size = sizeof(nv_seed), seed_size = 0, offset = 0;
 	efi_rng_protocol_t *rng = NULL;
 	efi_status_t status;
 
 	status = efi_bs_call(locate_protocol, &rng_proto, NULL, (void **)&rng);
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
-		return status;
+	if (status == EFI_SUCCESS)
+		seed_size += EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
+
+	status = get_efi_var(L"RandomSeed", &rng_table_guid, NULL, &nv_seed_size, nv_seed);
+	if (status == EFI_SUCCESS)
+		seed_size += nv_seed_size;
+	else
+		nv_seed_size = 0;
+
+	if (!seed_size)
+		return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
 
 	/*
 	 * Check whether a seed was provided by a prior boot stage. In that
@@ -83,7 +93,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void)
 	 * Note that we should read the seed size with caution, in case the
 	 * table got corrupted in memory somehow.
 	 */
-	prev_seed = get_efi_config_table(LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID);
+	prev_seed = get_efi_config_table(rng_table_guid);
 	if (prev_seed && prev_seed->size <= 512U) {
 		prev_seed_size = prev_seed->size;
 		seed_size += prev_seed_size;
@@ -103,7 +113,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void)
 	}
 
 	status = efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, &rng_algo_raw,
-				EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
+				EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits + offset);
 
 	if (status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)
 		/*
@@ -111,16 +121,37 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void)
 		 * is not implemented.
 		 */
 		status = efi_call_proto(rng, get_rng, NULL,
-					EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits);
+					EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, seed->bits + offset);
 
-	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+	if (status == EFI_SUCCESS)
+		offset += EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE;
+
+	if (nv_seed_size) {
+		memcpy(seed->bits + offset, nv_seed, nv_seed_size);
+		memzero_explicit(nv_seed, nv_seed_size);
+		/*
+		 * We delete the seed here, and /hope/ that this causes EFI to
+		 * also zero out its representation on disk. This is somewhat
+		 * idealistic, but overwriting the variable with zeros is
+		 * likely just as fraught too. TODO: in the future, maybe we
+		 * can hash it forward instead, and write a new seed.
+		 */
+		status = set_efi_var(L"RandomSeed", &rng_table_guid, 0, 0, NULL);
+		if (status == EFI_SUCCESS)
+			offset += nv_seed_size;
+		else
+			memzero_explicit(seed->bits + offset, nv_seed_size);
+	}
+
+	if (!offset)
 		goto err_freepool;
 
-	seed->size = seed_size;
-	if (prev_seed_size)
-		memcpy(seed->bits + EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE, prev_seed->bits,
-		       prev_seed_size);
+	if (prev_seed_size) {
+		memcpy(seed->bits + offset, prev_seed->bits, prev_seed_size);
+		offset += prev_seed_size;
+	}
 
+	seed->size = offset;
 	status = efi_bs_call(install_configuration_table, &rng_table_guid, seed);
 	if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
 		goto err_freepool;
@@ -135,7 +166,7 @@ efi_status_t efi_random_get_seed(void)
 err_freepool:
 	memzero_explicit(seed, struct_size(seed, bits, seed_size));
 	efi_bs_call(free_pool, seed);
-	efi_warn("Failed to obtain seed from EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL\n");
+	efi_warn("Failed to obtain seed from EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL and EFI variable\n");
 err_warn:
 	if (prev_seed)
 		efi_warn("Retaining bootloader-supplied seed only");
-- 
2.38.1