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Message-ID: <166927752150.4906.4076564626502028600.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2022 08:12:01 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/boot] x86/boot/compressed: Move startup32_check_sev_cbit()
out of head_64.S
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 9d7eaae6a071ff1f718e0aa5e610bb712f8cc632
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/9d7eaae6a071ff1f718e0aa5e610bb712f8cc632
Author: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
AuthorDate: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 17:10:14 +01:00
Committer: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
CommitterDate: Thu, 24 Nov 2022 08:57:41 +01:00
x86/boot/compressed: Move startup32_check_sev_cbit() out of head_64.S
Now that the startup32_check_sev_cbit() routine can execute from
anywhere and behaves like an ordinary function, it can be moved where it
belongs.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122161017.2426828-15-ardb@kernel.org
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 71 +-------------------------
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
index 30ba541..db577fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
@@ -711,77 +711,6 @@ SYM_DATA_START(boot_idt)
SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(boot_idt, SYM_L_GLOBAL, boot_idt_end)
/*
- * Check for the correct C-bit position when the startup_32 boot-path is used.
- *
- * The check makes use of the fact that all memory is encrypted when paging is
- * disabled. The function creates 64 bits of random data using the RDRAND
- * instruction. RDRAND is mandatory for SEV guests, so always available. If the
- * hypervisor violates that the kernel will crash right here.
- *
- * The 64 bits of random data are stored to a memory location and at the same
- * time kept in the %eax and %ebx registers. Since encryption is always active
- * when paging is off the random data will be stored encrypted in main memory.
- *
- * Then paging is enabled. When the C-bit position is correct all memory is
- * still mapped encrypted and comparing the register values with memory will
- * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that
- * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail.
- */
-#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
- .text
-SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
- pushl %ebx
- pushl %ebp
-
- call 0f
-0: popl %ebp
-
- /* Check for non-zero sev_status */
- movl (sev_status - 0b)(%ebp), %eax
- testl %eax, %eax
- jz 4f
-
- /*
- * Get two 32-bit random values - Don't bail out if RDRAND fails
- * because it is better to prevent forward progress if no random value
- * can be gathered.
- */
-1: rdrand %eax
- jnc 1b
-2: rdrand %ebx
- jnc 2b
-
- /* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */
- leal (sev_check_data - 0b)(%ebp), %ebp
- movl %eax, 0(%ebp)
- movl %ebx, 4(%ebp)
-
- /* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */
- movl %cr0, %edx /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */
- movl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */
- movl %ecx, %cr0
-
- cmpl %eax, 0(%ebp)
- jne 3f
- cmpl %ebx, 4(%ebp)
- jne 3f
-
- movl %edx, %cr0 /* Restore previous %cr0 */
-
- jmp 4f
-
-3: /* Check failed - hlt the machine */
- hlt
- jmp 3b
-
-4:
- popl %ebp
- popl %ebx
- RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
-#endif
-
-/*
* Stack and heap for uncompression
*/
.bss
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
index 6747e5e..14cf04a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S
@@ -243,6 +243,74 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_load_idt)
RET
SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_load_idt)
+/*
+ * Check for the correct C-bit position when the startup_32 boot-path is used.
+ *
+ * The check makes use of the fact that all memory is encrypted when paging is
+ * disabled. The function creates 64 bits of random data using the RDRAND
+ * instruction. RDRAND is mandatory for SEV guests, so always available. If the
+ * hypervisor violates that the kernel will crash right here.
+ *
+ * The 64 bits of random data are stored to a memory location and at the same
+ * time kept in the %eax and %ebx registers. Since encryption is always active
+ * when paging is off the random data will be stored encrypted in main memory.
+ *
+ * Then paging is enabled. When the C-bit position is correct all memory is
+ * still mapped encrypted and comparing the register values with memory will
+ * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that
+ * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail.
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+ pushl %ebx
+ pushl %ebp
+
+ call 0f
+0: popl %ebp
+
+ /* Check for non-zero sev_status */
+ movl (sev_status - 0b)(%ebp), %eax
+ testl %eax, %eax
+ jz 4f
+
+ /*
+ * Get two 32-bit random values - Don't bail out if RDRAND fails
+ * because it is better to prevent forward progress if no random value
+ * can be gathered.
+ */
+1: rdrand %eax
+ jnc 1b
+2: rdrand %ebx
+ jnc 2b
+
+ /* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */
+ leal (sev_check_data - 0b)(%ebp), %ebp
+ movl %eax, 0(%ebp)
+ movl %ebx, 4(%ebp)
+
+ /* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */
+ movl %cr0, %edx /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */
+ movl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */
+ movl %ecx, %cr0
+
+ cmpl %eax, 0(%ebp)
+ jne 3f
+ cmpl %ebx, 4(%ebp)
+ jne 3f
+
+ movl %edx, %cr0 /* Restore previous %cr0 */
+
+ jmp 4f
+
+3: /* Check failed - hlt the machine */
+ hlt
+ jmp 3b
+
+4:
+ popl %ebp
+ popl %ebx
+ RET
+SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
+
.code64
#include "../../kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S"
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