linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 0/3] bpf: Add LDX/STX/ST sanitize in jited BPF progs

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Message-ID: <CAADnVQ+G5AuJgo0iRmGOzzr2sS-Ddz6Dt-_99hS+q=VXPpHH7Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Sun, 27 Nov 2022 18:12:12 -0800
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Hao Sun <sunhao.th@...il.com>
Cc:     bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
        Song Liu <song@...nel.org>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
        Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...gle.com>,
        Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 0/3] bpf: Add LDX/STX/ST sanitize in jited BPF progs

On Sun, Nov 27, 2022 at 5:41 PM Hao Sun <sunhao.th@...il.com> wrote:
>
> Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> 于2022年11月28日周一 08:38写道：
> >
> > On Fri, Nov 25, 2022 at 08:29:09PM +0800, Hao Sun wrote:
> > > The verifier sometimes makes mistakes[1][2] that may be exploited to
> > > achieve arbitrary read/write. Currently, syzbot is continuously testing
> > > bpf, and can find memory issues in bpf syscalls, but it can hardly find
> > > mischecking/bugs in the verifier. We need runtime checks like KASAN in
> > > BPF programs for this. This patch series implements address sanitize
> > > in jited BPF progs for testing purpose, so that tools like syzbot can
> > > find interesting bugs in the verifier automatically by, if possible,
> > > generating and executing BPF programs that bypass the verifier but have
> > > memory issues, then triggering this sanitizing.
> >
> > The above paragraph makes it sound that it's currently impossible to
> > use kasan with BPF. Which is confusing and incorrect statement.
> > kasan adds all the necessary instrumentation to BPF interpreter already
> > and syzbot can perform bug discovery.
> > syzbot runner should just disable JIT and run all progs via interpreter.
> > Adding all this logic to run JITed progs in kasan kernel is
> > just unnecessary complexity.
>
> Sorry for the confusion, I mean JITed BPF prog can't use KASAN currently,
> maybe it should be called BPF_JITED_PROG_KASAN.
>
> It's actually useful because JIT is used in most real cases for testing/fuzzing,
> syzbot uses WITH_JIT_ALWAYS_ON[1][2].

Just turn it off in syzbot. jit_always_on is a security feature
because of speculative execution bugs that can exploit
any in-kernel interpreter (not only bpf interpreter).

> For those tools, they may need
> to run hundred times for each generated BPF prog to find interesting bugs in
> the verifier, JIT makes it much faster.

Unlikely. With all the overhead of saving a bunch of regs,
restoring them and calling functions instead of direct load/store
such JITed code is probably running at the same speed as
interpreter.
Also syzbot generated progs are tiny.
Your oob reproducer is tiny too.
The speed of execution doesn't matter in such cases.

> Also, bugs in JIT can be
> missed if they're
> disabled.

Disagree. Replacing direct load/store with calls
doesn't improve JIT test coverage.

Also think long term. Beyond kasan there are various *sans
that instrument code differently. load/store may not be
the only insns that should be instrumented.
So hacking JITs either directly or via verifier isn't going
to scale.