Message-ID: <CAGtprH9Ecy_tBSuffX9SCBqoeDQEkWHO8ovaMGy4wx+jZoXT9w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 29 Nov 2022 10:01:29 -0800
From:   Vishal Annapurve <vannapurve@...gle.com>
To:     Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
Cc:     Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        qemu-devel@...gnu.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
        Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
        Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@...cent.com>,
        Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>,
        Joerg Roedel <joro@...tes.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        x86@...nel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Jeff Layton <jlayton@...nel.org>,
        "J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>,
        Steven Price <steven.price@....com>,
        "Maciej S . Szmigiero" <mail@...iej.szmigiero.name>,
        Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
        Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        luto@...nel.org, jun.nakajima@...el.com, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        ak@...ux.intel.com, david@...hat.com, aarcange@...hat.com,
        ddutile@...hat.com, dhildenb@...hat.com,
        Quentin Perret <qperret@...gle.com>, tabba@...gle.com,
        mhocko@...e.com, Muchun Song <songmuchun@...edance.com>,
        wei.w.wang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 1/8] mm: Introduce memfd_restricted system call to
 create restricted user memory

On Mon, Nov 28, 2022 at 4:37 PM Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 25, 2022 at 11:13:37PM +0800, Chao Peng wrote:
> > From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> >
> > Introduce 'memfd_restricted' system call with the ability to create
> > memory areas that are restricted from userspace access through ordinary
> > MMU operations (e.g. read/write/mmap). The memory content is expected to
> > be used through a new in-kernel interface by a third kernel module.
> >
> > memfd_restricted() is useful for scenarios where a file descriptor(fd)
> > can be used as an interface into mm but want to restrict userspace's
> > ability on the fd. Initially it is designed to provide protections for
> > KVM encrypted guest memory.
> >
> > Normally KVM uses memfd memory via mmapping the memfd into KVM userspace
> > (e.g. QEMU) and then using the mmaped virtual address to setup the
> > mapping in the KVM secondary page table (e.g. EPT). With confidential
> > computing technologies like Intel TDX, the memfd memory may be encrypted
> > with special key for special software domain (e.g. KVM guest) and is not
> > expected to be directly accessed by userspace. Precisely, userspace
> > access to such encrypted memory may lead to host crash so should be
> > prevented.
> >
> > memfd_restricted() provides semantics required for KVM guest encrypted
> > memory support that a fd created with memfd_restricted() is going to be
> > used as the source of guest memory in confidential computing environment
> > and KVM can directly interact with core-mm without the need to expose
> > the memoy content into KVM userspace.
> >
> > KVM userspace is still in charge of the lifecycle of the fd. It should
> > pass the created fd to KVM. KVM uses the new restrictedmem_get_page() to
> > obtain the physical memory page and then uses it to populate the KVM
> > secondary page table entries.
> >
> > The userspace restricted memfd can be fallocate-ed or hole-punched
> > from userspace. When these operations happen, KVM can get notified
> > through restrictedmem_notifier, it then gets chance to remove any
> > mapped entries of the range in the secondary page tables.
> >
> > memfd_restricted() itself is implemented as a shim layer on top of real
> > memory file systems (currently tmpfs). Pages in restrictedmem are marked
> > as unmovable and unevictable, this is required for current confidential
> > usage. But in future this might be changed.
> >
> > By default memfd_restricted() prevents userspace read, write and mmap.
> > By defining new bit in the 'flags', it can be extended to support other
> > restricted semantics in the future.
> >
> > The system call is currently wired up for x86 arch.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl |   1 +
> >  arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl |   1 +
> >  include/linux/restrictedmem.h          |  62 ++++++
> >  include/linux/syscalls.h               |   1 +
> >  include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h      |   5 +-
> >  include/uapi/linux/magic.h             |   1 +
> >  kernel/sys_ni.c                        |   3 +
> >  mm/Kconfig                             |   4 +
> >  mm/Makefile                            |   1 +
> >  mm/restrictedmem.c                     | 250 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  10 files changed, 328 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >  create mode 100644 include/linux/restrictedmem.h
> >  create mode 100644 mm/restrictedmem.c
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> > index 320480a8db4f..dc70ba90247e 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
> > @@ -455,3 +455,4 @@
> >  448  i386    process_mrelease        sys_process_mrelease
> >  449  i386    futex_waitv             sys_futex_waitv
> >  450  i386    set_mempolicy_home_node         sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
> > +451  i386    memfd_restricted        sys_memfd_restricted
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> > index c84d12608cd2..06516abc8318 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
> > @@ -372,6 +372,7 @@
> >  448  common  process_mrelease        sys_process_mrelease
> >  449  common  futex_waitv             sys_futex_waitv
> >  450  common  set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node
> > +451  common  memfd_restricted        sys_memfd_restricted
> >
> >  #
> >  # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
> > diff --git a/include/linux/restrictedmem.h b/include/linux/restrictedmem.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..9c37c3ea3180
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/include/linux/restrictedmem.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */
> > +#ifndef _LINUX_RESTRICTEDMEM_H
> > +
> > +#include <linux/file.h>
> > +#include <linux/magic.h>
> > +#include <linux/pfn_t.h>
> > +
> > +struct restrictedmem_notifier;
> > +
> > +struct restrictedmem_notifier_ops {
> > +     void (*invalidate_start)(struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier,
> > +                              pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end);
> > +     void (*invalidate_end)(struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier,
> > +                            pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end);
> > +};
> > +
> > +struct restrictedmem_notifier {
> > +     struct list_head list;
> > +     const struct restrictedmem_notifier_ops *ops;
> > +};
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_RESTRICTEDMEM
> > +
> > +void restrictedmem_register_notifier(struct file *file,
> > +                                  struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier);
> > +void restrictedmem_unregister_notifier(struct file *file,
> > +                                    struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier);
> > +
> > +int restrictedmem_get_page(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset,
> > +                        struct page **pagep, int *order);
> > +
> > +static inline bool file_is_restrictedmem(struct file *file)
> > +{
> > +     return file->f_inode->i_sb->s_magic == RESTRICTEDMEM_MAGIC;
> > +}
> > +
> > +#else
> > +
> > +static inline void restrictedmem_register_notifier(struct file *file,
> > +                                  struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline void restrictedmem_unregister_notifier(struct file *file,
> > +                                    struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline int restrictedmem_get_page(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset,
> > +                                      struct page **pagep, int *order)
> > +{
> > +     return -1;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static inline bool file_is_restrictedmem(struct file *file)
> > +{
> > +     return false;
> > +}
> > +
> > +#endif /* CONFIG_RESTRICTEDMEM */
> > +
> > +#endif /* _LINUX_RESTRICTEDMEM_H */
> > diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > index a34b0f9a9972..f9e9e0c820c5 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
> > @@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned int flags);
> >  asmlinkage long sys_set_mempolicy_home_node(unsigned long start, unsigned long len,
> >                                           unsigned long home_node,
> >                                           unsigned long flags);
> > +asmlinkage long sys_memfd_restricted(unsigned int flags);
> >
> >  /*
> >   * Architecture-specific system calls
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> > index 45fa180cc56a..e93cd35e46d0 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
> > @@ -886,8 +886,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv)
> >  #define __NR_set_mempolicy_home_node 450
> >  __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node)
> >
> > +#define __NR_memfd_restricted 451
> > +__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_restricted, sys_memfd_restricted)
> > +
> >  #undef __NR_syscalls
> > -#define __NR_syscalls 451
> > +#define __NR_syscalls 452
> >
> >  /*
> >   * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
> > index 6325d1d0e90f..8aa38324b90a 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
> > @@ -101,5 +101,6 @@
> >  #define DMA_BUF_MAGIC                0x444d4142      /* "DMAB" */
> >  #define DEVMEM_MAGIC         0x454d444d      /* "DMEM" */
> >  #define SECRETMEM_MAGIC              0x5345434d      /* "SECM" */
> > +#define RESTRICTEDMEM_MAGIC  0x5245534d      /* "RESM" */
> >
> >  #endif /* __LINUX_MAGIC_H__ */
> > diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
> > index 860b2dcf3ac4..7c4a32cbd2e7 100644
> > --- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
> > +++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
> > @@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ COND_SYSCALL(pkey_free);
> >  /* memfd_secret */
> >  COND_SYSCALL(memfd_secret);
> >
> > +/* memfd_restricted */
> > +COND_SYSCALL(memfd_restricted);
> > +
> >  /*
> >   * Architecture specific weak syscall entries.
> >   */
> > diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
> > index 0331f1461f81..0177d53676c7 100644
> > --- a/mm/Kconfig
> > +++ b/mm/Kconfig
> > @@ -1076,6 +1076,10 @@ config IO_MAPPING
> >  config SECRETMEM
> >       def_bool ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP && !EMBEDDED
> >
> > +config RESTRICTEDMEM
> > +     bool
> > +     depends on TMPFS
> > +
> >  config ANON_VMA_NAME
> >       bool "Anonymous VMA name support"
> >       depends on PROC_FS && ADVISE_SYSCALLS && MMU
> > diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
> > index 9a564f836403..6cb6403ffd40 100644
> > --- a/mm/Makefile
> > +++ b/mm/Makefile
> > @@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION) += page_ext.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK) += page_table_check.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_CMA_DEBUGFS) += cma_debug.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_RESTRICTEDMEM) += restrictedmem.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_CMA_SYSFS) += cma_sysfs.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_USERFAULTFD) += userfaultfd.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_IDLE_PAGE_TRACKING) += page_idle.o
> > diff --git a/mm/restrictedmem.c b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..e5bf8907e0f8
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/mm/restrictedmem.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +#include "linux/sbitmap.h"
> > +#include <linux/pagemap.h>
> > +#include <linux/pseudo_fs.h>
> > +#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
> > +#include <linux/syscalls.h>
> > +#include <uapi/linux/falloc.h>
> > +#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
> > +#include <linux/restrictedmem.h>
> > +
> > +struct restrictedmem_data {
> > +     struct mutex lock;
> > +     struct file *memfd;
> > +     struct list_head notifiers;
> > +};
> > +
> > +static void restrictedmem_notifier_invalidate(struct restrictedmem_data *data,
> > +                              pgoff_t start, pgoff_t end, bool notify_start)
> > +{
> > +     struct restrictedmem_notifier *notifier;
> > +
> > +     mutex_lock(&data->lock);
> > +     list_for_each_entry(notifier, &data->notifiers, list) {
> > +             if (notify_start)
> > +                     notifier->ops->invalidate_start(notifier, start, end);
> > +             else
> > +                     notifier->ops->invalidate_end(notifier, start, end);
> > +     }
> > +     mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int restrictedmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> > +{
> > +     struct restrictedmem_data *data = inode->i_mapping->private_data;
> > +
> > +     fput(data->memfd);
> > +     kfree(data);
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static long restrictedmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
> > +                                 loff_t offset, loff_t len)
> > +{
> > +     struct restrictedmem_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
> > +     struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
> > +     int ret;
> > +
> > +     if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE) {
> > +             if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(offset) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(len))
> > +                     return -EINVAL;
> > +     }
> > +
> > +     restrictedmem_notifier_invalidate(data, offset, offset + len, true);
>
> The KVM restrictedmem ops seem to expect pgoff_t, but here we pass
> loff_t. For SNP we've made this strange as part of the following patch
> and it seems to produce the expected behavior:
>
>   https://github.com/mdroth/linux/commit/d669c7d3003ff7a7a47e73e8c3b4eeadbd2c4eb6
>
> > +     ret = memfd->f_op->fallocate(memfd, mode, offset, len);
> > +     restrictedmem_notifier_invalidate(data, offset, offset + len, false);
> > +     return ret;
> > +}
> > +
>
> <snip>
>
> > +int restrictedmem_get_page(struct file *file, pgoff_t offset,
> > +                        struct page **pagep, int *order)
> > +{
> > +     struct restrictedmem_data *data = file->f_mapping->private_data;
> > +     struct file *memfd = data->memfd;
> > +     struct page *page;
> > +     int ret;
> > +
> > +     ret = shmem_getpage(file_inode(memfd), offset, &page, SGP_WRITE);
>
> This will result in KVM allocating pages that userspace hasn't necessary
> fallocate()'d. In the case of SNP we need to get the PFN so we can clean
> up the RMP entries when restrictedmem invalidations are issued for a GFN
> range.
>
> If the guest supports lazy-acceptance however, these pages may not have
> been faulted in yet, and if the VMM defers actually fallocate()'ing space
> until the guest actually tries to issue a shared->private for that GFN
> (to support lazy-pinning), then there may never be a need to allocate
> pages for these backends.
>
> However, the restrictedmem invalidations are for GFN ranges so there's
> no way to know inadvance whether it's been allocated yet or not. The
> xarray is one option but currently it defaults to 'private' so that
> doesn't help us here. It might if we introduced a 'uninitialized' state
> or something along that line instead of just the binary
> 'shared'/'private' though...
>
> But for now we added a restrictedmem_get_page_noalloc() that uses
> SGP_NONE instead of SGP_WRITE to avoid accidentally allocating a bunch
> of memory as part of guest shutdown, and a
> kvm_restrictedmem_get_pfn_noalloc() variant to go along with that. But
> maybe a boolean param is better? Or maybe SGP_NOALLOC is the better
> default, and we just propagate an error to userspace if they didn't
> fallocate() in advance?
>

One caveat with SGP_NOALLOC being default: For performance reasons (to
avoid frequent userspace exits), VMM will have to always preallocate
all the guest restricted memory. In general this will prevent VMM from
overcommitting.


> -Mike
>
> > +     if (ret)
> > +             return ret;
> > +
> > +     *pagep = page;
> > +     if (order)
> > +             *order = thp_order(compound_head(page));
> > +
> > +     SetPageUptodate(page);
> > +     unlock_page(page);
> > +
> > +     return 0;
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(restrictedmem_get_page);
> > --
> > 2.25.1
> >

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