linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] 9p: fix crash when transaction killed

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Message-ID: <Y4aJzjlkkt5VKy0G@codewreck.org>
Date:   Wed, 30 Nov 2022 07:38:06 +0900
From:   asmadeus@...ewreck.org
To:     Schspa Shi <schspa@...il.com>
Cc:     ericvh@...il.com, lucho@...kov.net, linux_oss@...debyte.co,
        davem@...emloft.net, edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org,
        pabeni@...hat.com, v9fs-developer@...ts.sourceforge.net,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        syzbot+8f1060e2aaf8ca55220b@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] 9p: fix crash when transaction killed

Schspa Shi wrote on Wed, Nov 30, 2022 at 12:22:51AM +0800:
> The transport layer of fs does not fully support the cancel request.
> When the request is in the REQ_STATUS_SENT state, p9_fd_cancelled
> will forcibly delete the request, and at this time p9_[read/write]_work
> may continue to use the request. Therefore, it causes UAF .
> 
> There is the logs from syzbot.
> 
> Corrupted memory at 0xffff88807eade00b [ 0xff 0x07 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
> 0x00 0x00 . . . . . . . . ] (in kfence-#110):
>  p9_fcall_fini net/9p/client.c:248 [inline]
>  p9_req_put net/9p/client.c:396 [inline]
>  p9_req_put+0x208/0x250 net/9p/client.c:390
>  p9_client_walk+0x247/0x540 net/9p/client.c:1165
>  clone_fid fs/9p/fid.h:21 [inline]
>  v9fs_fid_xattr_set+0xe4/0x2b0 fs/9p/xattr.c:118
>  v9fs_xattr_set fs/9p/xattr.c:100 [inline]
>  v9fs_xattr_handler_set+0x6f/0x120 fs/9p/xattr.c:159
>  __vfs_setxattr+0x119/0x180 fs/xattr.c:182
>  __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x129/0x5f0 fs/xattr.c:216
>  __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x1d3/0x260 fs/xattr.c:277
>  vfs_setxattr+0x143/0x340 fs/xattr.c:309
>  setxattr+0x146/0x160 fs/xattr.c:617
>  path_setxattr+0x197/0x1c0 fs/xattr.c:636
>  __do_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:652 [inline]
>  __se_sys_setxattr fs/xattr.c:648 [inline]
>  __ia32_sys_setxattr+0xc0/0x160 fs/xattr.c:648
>  do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline]
>  __do_fast_syscall_32+0x65/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178
>  do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203
>  entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82
> 
> Below is a similar scenario, the scenario in the syzbot log looks more
> complicated than this one, but the root cause seems to be the same.
> 
>      T21124               p9_write_work        p9 read_work
> ======================== first trans =================================
> p9_client_walk
>   p9_client_rpc
>     p9_client_prepare_req
>     /* req->refcount == 2 */
>     c->trans_mod->request(c, req);
>       p9_fd_request
>         req move to unsent_req_list
>                             req->status = REQ_STATUS_SENT;
>                             req move to req_list
>                             << send to server >>
>     wait_event_killable
>     << get kill signal >>
>     if (c->trans_mod->cancel(c, req))
>        p9_client_flush(c, req);
>          /* send flush request */
>          req = p9_client_rpc(c, P9_TFLUSH, "w", oldtag);
> 		 if (c->trans_mod->cancelled)
>             c->trans_mod->cancelled(c, oldreq);
>               /* old req was deleted from req_list */
>               /* req->refcount == 1 */
>   p9_req_put
>     /* req->refcount == 0 */
>     << preempted >>
>                                        << get response, UAF here >>
>                                        m->rreq = p9_tag_lookup(m->client, m->rc.tag);
>                                          /* req->refcount == 1 */
>                                        << do response >>
>                                        p9_client_cb(m->client, m->rreq, REQ_STATUS_RCVD);
>                                          /* req->refcount == 0 */
>                                          p9_fcall_fini
>                                          /* request have been freed */
>     p9_fcall_fini
>      /* double free */
>                                        p9_req_put(m->client, m->rreq);
>                                          /* req->refcount == 1 */
> 
> To fix it, we can wait the request with status REQ_STATUS_SENT returned.

Christian replied on this (we cannot wait) but I agree with him -- the
scenario you describe is proteced by p9_tag_lookup checking for refcount
with refcount_inc_not_zero (p9_req_try_get).

The normal scenarii for flush are as follow:
 - cancel before request is sent: no flush, just free
 - flush is ignored and reply comes first: we get reply from original
request then reply from flush
 - flush is handled and reply never comes: we only get reply from flush

Protocol-wise, we can safely reuse the tag after the flush reply got
received; and as far as I can follow the code we only ever free the tag
(last p9_call_fini) after flush has returned so the entry should be
protected.

If we receive a response on the given tag between cancelled and the main
thread going out the request has been marked as FLSHD and should be
ignored. . . here is one p9_req_put in p9_read_work() in this case but
it corresponds to the ref obtained by p9_tag_lookup() so it should be
valid.


I'm happy to believe we have a race somewhere (even if no sane server
would produce it), but right now I don't see it looking at the code.. :/

-- 
Dominique