| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <20221130230934.1014142-32-seanjc@google.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 23:09:15 +0000
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Marc Zyngier <maz@...nel.org>,
Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@...nel.org>,
Aleksandar Markovic <aleksandar.qemu.devel@...il.com>,
Anup Patel <anup@...infault.org>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...belt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@...ux.ibm.com>,
Janosch Frank <frankja@...ux.ibm.com>,
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@...ux.ibm.com>,
Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@...ux.ibm.com>,
Eric Farman <farman@...ux.ibm.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
Paul Durrant <paul@....org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@....com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@....com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@....com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>,
Atish Patra <atishp@...shpatra.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu, linux-mips@...r.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, kvm-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@...el.com>,
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@...hat.com>,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@...aro.org>,
Fabiano Rosas <farosas@...ux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH v2 31/50] KVM: x86: Do CPU compatibility checks in x86 code
Move the CPU compatibility checks to pure x86 code, i.e. drop x86's use
of the common kvm_x86_check_cpu_compat() arch hook. x86 is the only
architecture that "needs" to do per-CPU compatibility checks, moving
the logic to x86 will allow dropping the common code, and will also
give x86 more control over when/how the compatibility checks are
performed, e.g. TDX will need to enable hardware (do VMXON) in order to
perform compatibility checks.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 19e81a99c58f..d7ea1c1175c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -5103,7 +5103,7 @@ static int __init svm_init(void)
* Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
* exposed to userspace!
*/
- r = kvm_init(&svm_init_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_svm),
+ r = kvm_init(NULL, sizeof(struct vcpu_svm),
__alignof__(struct vcpu_svm), THIS_MODULE);
if (r)
goto err_kvm_init;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 654d81f781da..8deb1bd60c10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -8592,7 +8592,7 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
* Common KVM initialization _must_ come last, after this, /dev/kvm is
* exposed to userspace!
*/
- r = kvm_init(&vmx_init_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
+ r = kvm_init(NULL, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
__alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
if (r)
goto err_kvm_init;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 66f16458aa97..3571bc968cf8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -9277,10 +9277,36 @@ static inline void kvm_ops_update(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
kvm_pmu_ops_update(ops->pmu_ops);
}
+struct kvm_cpu_compat_check {
+ struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops;
+ int *ret;
+};
+
+static int kvm_x86_check_processor_compatibility(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id());
+
+ WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ if (__cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, c) !=
+ __cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, &boot_cpu_data))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return ops->check_processor_compatibility();
+}
+
+static void kvm_x86_check_cpu_compat(void *data)
+{
+ struct kvm_cpu_compat_check *c = data;
+
+ *c->ret = kvm_x86_check_processor_compatibility(c->ops);
+}
+
static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
{
+ struct kvm_cpu_compat_check c;
u64 host_pat;
- int r;
+ int r, cpu;
if (kvm_x86_ops.hardware_enable) {
pr_err("kvm: already loaded vendor module '%s'\n", kvm_x86_ops.name);
@@ -9360,6 +9386,14 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
if (r != 0)
goto out_mmu_exit;
+ c.ret = &r;
+ c.ops = ops;
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ smp_call_function_single(cpu, kvm_x86_check_cpu_compat, &c, 1);
+ if (r < 0)
+ goto out_hardware_unsetup;
+ }
+
/*
* Point of no return! DO NOT add error paths below this point unless
* absolutely necessary, as most operations from this point forward
@@ -9402,6 +9436,8 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
kvm_init_msr_list();
return 0;
+out_hardware_unsetup:
+ ops->runtime_ops->hardware_unsetup();
out_mmu_exit:
kvm_mmu_vendor_module_exit();
out_free_percpu:
@@ -12037,16 +12073,7 @@ void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void)
int kvm_arch_check_processor_compat(void *opaque)
{
- struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id());
- struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops = opaque;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- if (__cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, c) !=
- __cr4_reserved_bits(cpu_has, &boot_cpu_data))
- return -EIO;
-
- return ops->check_processor_compatibility();
+ return 0;
}
bool kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--
2.38.1.584.g0f3c55d4c2-goog
Powered by blists - more mailing lists