linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH-tip] sched: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus

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Message-ID: <330989bf-0015-6d4c-9317-bfc9dba30b65@redhat.com>
Date:   Thu, 1 Dec 2022 12:03:39 -0500
From:   Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
To:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Cc:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>,
        Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>,
        Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>,
        Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@...hat.com>,
        Phil Auld <pauld@...hat.com>,
        Wenjie Li <wenjieli@....qualcomm.com>,
        David Wang 王标 <wangbiao3@...omi.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH-tip] sched: Fix use-after-free bug in dup_user_cpus_ptr()

On 12/1/22 08:44, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Sun, Nov 27, 2022 at 08:44:41PM -0500, Waiman Long wrote:
>> Since commit 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be
>> restricted on asymmetric systems"), the setting and clearing of
>> user_cpus_ptr are done under pi_lock for arm64 architecture. However,
>> dup_user_cpus_ptr() accesses user_cpus_ptr without any lock
>> protection. When racing with the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in
>> __set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked(), it can lead to user-after-free and
>> double-free in arm64 kernel.
>>
>> Commit 8f9ea86fdf99 ("sched: Always preserve the user requested
>> cpumask") fixes this problem as user_cpus_ptr, once set, will never
>> be cleared in a task's lifetime. However, this bug was re-introduced
>> in commit 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in
>> do_set_cpus_allowed()") which allows the clearing of user_cpus_ptr in
>> do_set_cpus_allowed(). This time, it will affect all arches.
>>
>> Fix this bug by always clearing the user_cpus_ptr of the newly
>> cloned/forked task before the copying process starts and check the
>> user_cpus_ptr state of the source task under pi_lock.
>>
>> Note to stable, this patch won't be applicable to stable releases.
>> Just copy the new dup_user_cpus_ptr() function over.
>>
>> Fixes: 07ec77a1d4e8 ("sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be restricted on asymmetric systems")
>> Fixes: 851a723e45d1 ("sched: Always clear user_cpus_ptr in do_set_cpus_allowed()")
>> CC: stable@...r.kernel.org
>> Reported-by: David Wang 王标 <wangbiao3@...omi.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
>> ---
>>   kernel/sched/core.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>>   1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> As per my comments on the previous version of this patch:
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221201133602.GB28489@willie-the-truck/T/#t
>
> I think there are other issues to fix when racing affinity changes with
> fork() too.
It is certainly possible that there are other bugs hiding somewhere:-)
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
>> index 8df51b08bb38..f2b75faaf71a 100644
>> --- a/kernel/sched/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
>> @@ -2624,19 +2624,43 @@ void do_set_cpus_allowed(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *new_mask)
>>   int dup_user_cpus_ptr(struct task_struct *dst, struct task_struct *src,
>>   		      int node)
>>   {
>> +	cpumask_t *user_mask;
>>   	unsigned long flags;
>>   
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Always clear dst->user_cpus_ptr first as their user_cpus_ptr's
>> +	 * may differ by now due to racing.
>> +	 */
>> +	dst->user_cpus_ptr = NULL;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * This check is racy and losing the race is a valid situation.
>> +	 * It is not worth the extra overhead of taking the pi_lock on
>> +	 * every fork/clone.
>> +	 */
>>   	if (!src->user_cpus_ptr)
>>   		return 0;
> data_race() ?
Race is certainly possible, but the clearing of user_cpus_ptr before 
will mitigate any risk.
>
>>   
>> -	dst->user_cpus_ptr = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node);
>> -	if (!dst->user_cpus_ptr)
>> +	user_mask = kmalloc_node(cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, node);
>> +	if (!user_mask)
>>   		return -ENOMEM;
>>   
>> -	/* Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr */
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Use pi_lock to protect content of user_cpus_ptr
>> +	 *
>> +	 * Though unlikely, user_cpus_ptr can be reset to NULL by a concurrent
>> +	 * do_set_cpus_allowed().
>> +	 */
>>   	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&src->pi_lock, flags);
>> -	cpumask_copy(dst->user_cpus_ptr, src->user_cpus_ptr);
>> +	if (src->user_cpus_ptr) {
>> +		swap(dst->user_cpus_ptr, user_mask);
> Isn't 'dst->user_cpus_ptr' always NULL here? Why do we need the swap()
> instead of just assigning the thing directly?

True. We still need to clear user_mask. So I used swap() instead of 2 
assignment statements. I am fine to go with either way.

Cheers,
Longman